CT-ISG Collaborative Research: Tamper Proofing Cryptographic Operations

摘要：本研究项目侧重于开发加密数学模型和结构，以解决实现层面的实际安全需求。这是一个基本问题，因为加密安全形式经常被批评缺乏相关性，因为在实现级别上存在广泛的可用攻击。事实上，传统的加密攻击在访问私人数据的方式上受到限制；因此，依赖于此类构造的系统的安全性取决于外部非加密手段来强制执行必要的篡改弹性。不幸的是，这种物理防篡改要么太昂贵，要么不可靠。该研究扩展了密码攻击模型，包括各种形式的私有数据篡改和访问，并使密码结构理论更接近实践中的安全问题。特别地，在扩展的对抗性设置中考虑了一组广泛的加密原语的防篡改，例如数字签名、公钥加密、安全函数评估以及任意加密函数。因此，本研究探索了通过密码学手段在算法和实践中可实现的界限。

Abstract:This research project focuses on the development of cryptographic mathematical models and constructions that address realistic security requirements at the implementation level. This is a fundamental problem as cryptographic security formalisms are often criticized for lack of relevance given the wide range of attacks available at the implementation level. Indeed, traditional cryptographic attacks are restricted in the way private data can be accessed; hence, the security of systems relying on such constructs is contingent on external non-cryptographic means for enforcing the necessary tamper resilience. Unfortunately, this physical tamper resistance is either too expensive or unreliable. The research extends models of cryptographic attacks to include various forms of private data tampering and access and brings the theory of cryptographic constructions closer to security concerns in practice. In particular, the tamper proofing of a wide set of cryptographic primitives is considered in an extended adversarial setting, such as digital signatures, public key encryption, secure function evaluation, as well as arbitrary cryptographic functions. This research thus explores the boundaries of what is achievable algorithmically and practically through cryptographic means.