CT-ISG Collaborative Research: Tamper Proofing Cryptographic Operations

CT-ISG 合作研究：防篡改密码操作

• 批准号: 0831094
• 负责人: Tal Malkin
• 金额: $ 22.32万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-09-01 至 2011-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0831094&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CT; ISG; Collaborative; Research; Tamper

Abstract:This research project focuses on the development of cryptographic mathematical models and constructions that address realistic security requirements at the implementation level. This is a fundamental problem as cryptographic security formalisms are often criticized for lack of relevance given the wide range of attacks available at the implementation level. Indeed, traditional cryptographic attacks are restricted in the way private data can be accessed; hence, the security of systems relying on such constructs is contingent on external non-cryptographic means for enforcing the necessary tamper resilience. Unfortunately, this physical tamper resistance is either too expensive or unreliable. The research extends models of cryptographic attacks to include various forms of private data tampering and access and brings the theory of cryptographic constructions closer to security concerns in practice. In particular, the tamper proofing of a wide set of cryptographic primitives is considered in an extended adversarial setting, such as digital signatures, public key encryption, secure function evaluation, as well as arbitrary cryptographic functions. This research thus explores the boundaries of what is achievable algorithmically and practically through cryptographic means.

摘要：本研究项目的重点是开发密码数学模型和构造，以满足实现级别的现实安全需求。这是一个根本性的问题，因为密码安全形式经常被批评为缺乏相关性，因为在实施一级可用的攻击范围很广。事实上，传统的加密攻击在访问私有数据的方式上受到限制；因此，依赖于这种构造的系统的安全性取决于用于实施必要的篡改弹性的外部非加密手段。不幸的是，这种物理防篡改要么太昂贵，要么不可靠。这项研究将密码攻击的模型扩展到包括各种形式的私人数据篡改和访问，并使密码构造理论更接近实践中的安全问题。具体地，在诸如数字签名、公钥加密、安全函数评估以及任意密码函数的扩展对抗性设置中考虑广泛的密码原语的防篡改。因此，这项研究探索了通过密码手段在算法上和实践上可以实现的界限。