CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Tamper Proofing Cryptographic Operations

CT-ISG：协作研究：防篡改加密操作

• 批准号: 0831306
• 负责人: Aggelos Kiayias
• 金额: $ 22.32万
• 依托单位: University of Connecticut
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-09-01 至 2014-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0831306&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CT; ISG; Collaborative; Research; Tamper

Abstract:This research project focuses on the development of cryptographic mathematical models and constructions that address realistic security requirements at the implementation level. This is a fundamental problem as cryptographic security formalisms are often criticized for lack of relevance given the wide range of attacks available at the implementation level. Indeed, traditional cryptographic attacks are restricted in the way private data can be accessed; hence, the security of systems relying on such constructs is contingent on external non-cryptographic means for enforcing the necessary tamper resilience. Unfortunately, this physical tamper resistance is either too expensive or unreliable. The research extends models of cryptographic attacks to include various forms of private data tampering and access and brings the theory of cryptographic constructions closer to security concerns in practice. In particular, the tamper proofing of a wide set of cryptographic primitives is considered in an extended adversarial setting, such as digital signatures, public key encryption, secure function evaluation, as well as arbitrary cryptographic functions. This research thus explores the boundaries of what is achievable algorithmically and practically through cryptographic means.

翻译后摘要：本研究项目的重点是发展的密码数学模型和建设，以解决现实的安全要求，在 执行层面。 这是一个基本问题，因为密码安全形式主义经常被批评缺乏相关性，因为在实现级别上存在广泛的攻击。 事实上，传统的加密攻击在访问私有数据的方式上受到限制;因此，依赖此类结构的系统的安全性取决于用于实施必要的篡改弹性的外部非加密手段。 不幸的是，这种物理防篡改要么太昂贵，要么不可靠。 该研究扩展了密码攻击的模型，包括各种形式的私有数据篡改和访问，并使密码构造理论更接近实践中的安全问题。 特别是，在扩展的对抗性环境中考虑了广泛的加密原语集的防篡改，例如数字签名、公钥加密、安全函数评估以及任意加密函数。 因此，这项研究探讨了通过加密手段在算法和实践上可以实现的边界。