New Developments in Social Choice and Bargaining Theory: Welfarism and Incomplete Information

社会选择与讨价还价理论的新发展：福利主义与不完全信息

• 批准号: 0851210
• 负责人: Geoffroy de Clippel
• 金额: $ 11万
• 依托单位: Brown University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-07-01 至 2012-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0851210&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: New; Developments; Social; Choice; Bargaining

This research project has two main objectives. First, it offers an economic foundation of some classical solutions in the theories of social choice and bargaining by dropping the welfarist assumption. Second, it suggests possible ways of extending these two theories to problems with incomplete information.Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining and social choice are phrased in utilities. It is thus assumed, often implicitly, that two problems must have the same solution if they coincide in the utility space. Unfortunately, this welfarist assumption lacks both a clear normative and positive content, and is thus hard to accept as an axiom. This research project offers a better foundation of social choice and axiomatic bargaining by characterizing some of its main solutions in non-welfarist environments.Informational issues have long been recognized as central in economic theory. However, their implications on cooperation are still not yet well understood. Accordingly, Professor Aumann listed this topic as an important direction for future research in his 2000 presidential address to the Game Theory Society. To be more precise, an impressive amount of work has already been devoted to understand which contracts are feasible under asymmetric information, cf. the theory of mechanism design. Professors Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson were awarded the 2007 Sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel for their path-breaking contributions on the topic. Yet very little is known about what specific contract, among those that are feasible, should or will be chosen. This project investigates many different avenues to extend the theories of bargaining and social choice to incomplete information.The theories of social choice and axiomatic bargaining are widely applied, yet the welfarist assumption on which it is founded is not compelling without justification. The present research project will show how some classical axiomatic systems can be completed to derive welfarist solutions in non-welfarist frameworks. Very little work has been done so far on social choice and bargaining under incomplete information, yet there is a clear need of going beyond the mere description of what is feasible.Broader Impact: This research proposal is foundational in its focus. The importance of the questions considered implies that it could have a significant impact on many different practical economic problems. The normative analysis under incomplete information should guide the economic and social debates, concerning, for instance, public health insurance, taxes, or cost sharing. Part of this research will be developed in collaboration with researchers from three other universities: Camelia Bejan (Rice U), David Perez-Castrillo (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain), and David Wettstein (Ben Gurion University, Israel). The results of this research project will be integrated into a graduate-level course on information, risk and uncertainty that the investigator teaches at Brown University.

这个研究项目有两个主要目标。首先，它放弃了福利主义假设，为社会选择和议价理论中的一些经典解决方案提供了经济基础。其次，它提出了将这两种理论扩展到不完全信息问题的可能方法。公理化议价和社会选择的大部分贡献都是用效用来表达的。因此，通常隐含地假设，如果两个问题在效用空间中重合，它们必须具有相同的解。不幸的是，这种福利主义的假设既缺乏明确的规范内容，也缺乏积极的内容，因此很难被接受为公理。本研究项目通过描述非福利主义环境下社会选择和公理化议价的一些主要解决方案，为社会选择和公理化议价提供了更好的基础。长期以来，信息问题一直被认为是经济理论的核心。然而，它们对合作的影响还没有得到很好的理解。因此，奥曼教授在2000年博弈论学会主席演讲中将这一课题列为未来研究的重要方向。更确切地说，已经有大量的工作致力于理解在不对称信息下哪些契约是可行的，如机制设计理论。赫维奇、马斯金和迈尔森教授因在这一领域的开创性贡献而获得2007年瑞典央行经济学奖，以纪念阿尔弗雷德•诺贝尔（Alfred Nobel）。然而，在这些可行的合同中，应该或将选择哪些具体的合同，我们知之甚少。本项目研究了许多不同的途径，将议价理论和社会选择理论扩展到不完全信息。社会选择理论和公理化议价理论被广泛应用，然而，它所建立的福利主义假设，如果没有正当理由，就不会令人信服。目前的研究项目将展示如何完成一些经典公理系统来推导非福利主义框架中的福利主义解。到目前为止，关于不完全信息下的社会选择和讨价还价的研究还很少，但显然需要超越仅仅描述什么是可行的。更广泛的影响：这项研究计划是其重点的基础。所考虑的问题的重要性意味着它可能对许多不同的实际经济问题产生重大影响。信息不完全情况下的规范分析应指导有关公共健康保险、税收或费用分摊等问题的经济和社会辩论。这项研究的一部分将与来自其他三所大学的研究人员合作进行：Camelia Bejan（莱斯大学）、David Perez-Castrillo（西班牙巴塞罗那自治大学）和David Wettstein（以色列本古里安大学）。这个研究项目的结果将被整合到研究者在布朗大学教授的关于信息、风险和不确定性的研究生课程中。