New Issues in Matching Market Design

配套市场设计的新问题

• 批准号: 0924555
• 负责人: Parag Pathak
• 金额: $ 28.58万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-08-01 至 2013-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0924555&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: New; Issues; Matching; Market; Design

This project uses game theory and empirical analysis to understand the incentive and stability properties of resource allocation mechanisms. The investigator develops a theoretical framework to compare allocation methods based on the extent to which they are susceptible to 'gaming'. The goal is to understand whether one method is more or less easy for one group of participants to manipulate. This work provides a coherent analysis of existing allocation methods, and it also provides a framework for comparing new methods that are developed by other researchers.The second project funded by this award studies how a particular type of complementarity (the presence of couples) affects the inventives and performance of two-sided matching markets, such as those used for entry-level labor market clearinghouses. The data analysis part of this project uses data from the centralized labor market for psychologists.This research has substantial and direct social benefit. It creates tools that will aid school administrators in developing new ways to conduct school choice programs. The PI has already been involved in designing new methods for school choice programs in New York and Massachusetts.

本项目运用博弈论和实证分析来理解资源配置机制的激励性和稳定性。研究者开发了一个理论框架来比较分配方法的基础上，他们是易受“博弈”的程度。目的是了解一种方法对一组参与者来说是否更容易操作。这项工作提供了对现有分配方法的连贯分析，它也为比较其他研究人员开发的新方法提供了一个框架。由该奖项资助的第二个项目研究了一种特殊类型的互补性（夫妻的存在）如何影响双边匹配市场的创新和绩效，例如用于入门级劳动力市场清算所的市场。这个项目的数据分析部分使用了心理学家集中劳动力市场的数据。本研究具有实际而直接的社会效益。它创造了一些工具，帮助学校管理者开发新的方法来实施择校计划。PI已经参与设计了纽约和马萨诸塞州择校项目的新方法。