CAREER: Markets for Network Services

职业：网络服务市场

• 批准号: 0953884
• 负责人: John Musacchio
• 金额: $ 40万
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Cruz
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-02-01 至 2018-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0953884&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Markets; Network; Services

The economic model of network services, both services for basic connectivity as well as application layer services delivered via the network, is undergoing a period of unprecedented change. For instance, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that offer services such as voice over IP are deciding to use proprietary forms of service differentiation to improve these service offerings over those of competitors. As more ISPs implement service differentiation in a proprietary way, there is a danger that the opportunity to have a coherent architectural approach to service differentiation will be lost. This issue is tied to the net neutrality debate, in which one core issue is how ISPs and content/application service providers should share revenue. Some fundamental questions include the following. What are the market effects of having only competition between proprietary service stacks versus having competition at each layer? What architectural principles should be established in law or standards to induce the development of a market structure that results in higher welfare for all the stakeholders? Should both standard interfaces and/or charging practices be enforced between providers? This project investigates questions such as these in order to achieve a more complete understanding of the coupling of architecture and economics in network services. The project develops game theoretic models of the interaction of selfish users and providers, and then uses these models to understand the welfare effects of different architectural choices. The results of this project will inform the development of both the architecture and market structure of the network services industry.

网络服务的经济模式，包括基本连接服务和通过网络提供的应用层服务，正在经历一个前所未有的变化时期。例如，提供IP语音等服务的互联网服务提供商（ISP）决定使用专有形式的服务差异化来改进这些服务，使其优于竞争对手。随着越来越多的ISP以专有方式实现服务差异化，有一种危险，即失去了采用一致的体系结构方法来实现服务差异化的机会。这个问题与网络中立性辩论有关，其中一个核心问题是ISP和内容/应用服务提供商应该如何分享收入。一些基本问题包括如下。只有专有服务栈之间的竞争与在每一层都有竞争的市场效应是什么？在法律或标准中应确立哪些架构原则，以引导市场结构的发展，从而为所有利益相关者带来更高的福利？是否应在提供商之间强制执行标准接口和/或收费做法？这个项目调查的问题，如这些，以实现更完整的理解网络服务的架构和经济的耦合。该项目开发了自私的用户和供应商的互动博弈论模型，然后使用这些模型来了解不同的建筑选择的福利效应。该项目的结果将为网络服务行业的架构和市场结构的发展提供信息。