Doctoral Dissertation Research DRMS: Experimental Evidence and Measurement of Inter-Temporal Strategic Inefficiency

本研究从重复策略互动的角度来考虑效率。 也就是说，这项研究认为，几种类型的游戏，更复杂的真实的世界的情况下，在任意长的时间范围内发生多个时期的相互作用的简化表示。研究人员将研究如何在这些游戏中的回报结构的增强可以提供激励代理人默契地串通在一个更有效的结果超过重复播放。 这里提出的问题是重要的，不仅从机制设计的角度来看，而且在重复寡头垄断的相互作用的应用。 首先，我们关心的是相对收益的大小如何使一个特定的结果与其他结果相比更有吸引力，这可能是社会上的协调。我们评估了实验对象对的相对和绝对效率，以平均每周期的收益来衡量代理是否可以有效地协调以提取尽可能高的收益。在博弈的约束条件下， 如何诱导这种效率的知识是很重要的决策者，谁可以确定一个游戏的战略参数，和代理人局限于一组特定的战略参数。

This study considers efficiency from the perspective of repeated strategic interaction. Namely, the study considers several types of games that are simplified representations of more complex real world situations in which interaction occurs at multiple periods over an arbitrarily long time horizon. The researcher will examine how augmentation of the payoff structure in these games can provide incentives for agents to tacitly collude at a more efficient outcome over repeated play. The issues raised herein are important not only from a mechanism design standpoint, but also have applications in repeated oligopoly interaction. Primarily, we are concerned with how the relative magnitudes of payoffs may make a particular outcome more attractive for agents to coordinate upon in comparison to other outcomes, which may be socially inferior.For each type of strategic situation studied, we assess the relative and absolute efficiencies of experimental subject pairs in terms of average per period payoffs to see whether or not agents can effectively coordinate to extract as high a payoff as possible given the constraints of the game. Knowledge of how to induce such efficiencies is important to both policy makers, who may determine the strategic parameters of a game, and to agents confined to a particular set of strategic parameters.