Collaborative Research: Dynamic Perspectives on Costs and Conflict in Signaling Interactions

信号传递是一种非常基本的生物现象。 它几乎存在于生物组织的所有层次，在几乎所有生物过程中起着关键作用。虽然这些过程包括一组非常不同的现象，但它们的结构有一个共同的核心：至少一个发送者与至少一个接收者相互作用。这使得人们可以应用博弈的数学理论，这是一种关于战略互动的抽象理论。这个项目的目标是通过使用进化博弈论的方法来识别信号相互作用的稳定进化结果。 虽然我们已经很好地理解了信令的一些属性，但我们对可靠的信令如何在动态过程中出现的知识是有限的，特别是在发送者和接收者之间存在实质性利益冲突的情况下。如果传送所有相关信息不符合发送方的利益，那么如何实现可靠的信令？这个问题是生物学中大量问题的核心。它在许多经济互动中也发挥着非常突出的作用。 该项目将为广泛的研究项目提供重要的新成果，并将为实验和实地研究开辟未知的道路。 该项目涉及培训本科生和研究生以及开发教育工具。

Signaling is a very basic biological phenomenon. It is present at almost all levels of biological organization and it plays a crucial role in nearly all biological processes. Although these processes comprise a very diverse set of phenomena, there is a common core to their structure: at least one sender interacts with at least one receiver. This allows one to apply the mathematical theory of games, which is an abstract theory of strategic interactions. The goal of this project is to identify stable evolutionary outcomes of signaling interactions by using methods from evolutionary game theory. Although some properties of signaling are well understood, our knowledge of how reliable signaling emerges in a dynamic process is limited, especially in cases where there is substantial conflict of interest between a sender and a receiver. If it is not in the sender's interest to transfer all relevant information, how can reliable signaling be achieved? This question is at the heart of a huge number of problems in biology. It also plays a very prominent role in many economic interactions. This project will provide important new results for a wide array of research programs and will open up unknown paths for experiments and field studies. The project involves the training of undergraduate and graduate students and the development of educational tools.