TWC: Phase: Small: Censorship Counterstrike via Measurement, Filtering, Evasion, and Protocol Enhancement

这个项目研究当今一些民族国家实行的互联网审查制度。 这项工作强调分析审查员执行审查所使用的技术措施，其操作造成附带损害的程度（无意的阻止，或完全阻止审查国以外的活动），以及由于审查如何运作的具体细节而造成的漏洞。 关于后者，我们分析了审查监控如何检测特定的网络流量来抑制，或者监控器如何试图阻止或破坏目标流量的缺陷。 这方面的研究重点是监听网络链接的形式，分析传输流量的副本，然后注入伪造的流量，似乎是从一个通信端点发送到另一个端点，指示另一方停止通信。 这种“路径上”监控受到许多潜在的操纵和规避，这是由于监控器对通信方实际看到的通信的不精确视图。 我们特别致力于开发工具和改变互联网技术，以抵御这些形式的破坏，从而使用户能够自由地访问互联网。

This project studies Internet censorship as practiced by some of today's nation-states. The effort emphasizes analyzing the techncial measures used by censors to perform censorship, the extent to which their operations inflict collateral damage (unintended blocking, or blocking of activity wholly outside the censoring nation), and vulnerabilities due to the specifics of how censorship operates. Regarding this latter, we analyze flaws in either how the censorship monitoring detects particular network traffic to suppress, or in how the monitor then attempts to block or disrupt the target traffic. This facet of the research focuses on forms of monitoring that eavesdrop on network links, analyze copies of transmitted traffic, and then inject forged traffic, seemingly sent from one of the communication endpoints to the other, instructing the other party to cease communication. Such "on-path" monitoring is subject to a number of potential manipulations and evasions due to the inexact view the monitor has of the comunication as actually seen by the communicating parties. We in particular then work towards developing tools and changes to Internet technology that can resist these forms of disruption and thus enable users to access the Internet freely.