TWC: Medium: Collaborative: A Unified Statistics-Based Framework for Side-Channel Attack Analysis and Security Evaluation of Cryptosystems

侧信道攻击（SCA）已被证明是对许多密码系统的严重实现攻击。实际对策只能在一定程度上缓解脆弱性。迄今为止，对防泄漏密码学的大量研究尚未导致实际的防泄漏实现。一个阻碍的原因是缺乏普遍接受和健全的指标、标准和评估程序来衡量和评估密码系统对各种侧信道攻击的脆弱性/弹性。然而，侧信道的准确建模一直是应用密码学研究的开放性问题之一。该项目旨在通过形式化用于侧信道攻击分析和密码系统安全评估的通用框架来缩小SCA理论与实践之间的差距。所提出的框架量化了算法和实现特征对理论上最强最大似然攻击成功率的影响，揭示了系统固有的sca相关参数，用于安全性改进。该框架将从黑箱场景（通常是对手的现实情况）中观察到的测量数据中提取最大泄漏。该框架采用了最先进的统计方法来精确地分析和评估整体侧通道泄漏。这个整体框架将大大减轻安全系统架构师、软件开发人员和硬件设计人员在他们所设计的系统中构建SCA安全性的负担，从而最终产生可证明安全的硬件。

Side-channel attack (SCA) has shown to be a serious implementation attack to many cryptosystems. Practical countermeasures only mitigate the vulnerability to some extent. Considerable research efforts on leakage-resilient cryptography have so far not led to practical leakage-resilient implementations. One hindering reason is the lack of commonly accepted and sound metrics, standards, and evaluation procedures to measure and evaluate the vulnerability/resilience of cryptosystems to various side-channel attacks. Accurate modeling of side channels, however, is one of the open problems in applied crypto research. This project aims to close the gap between SCA theories and practices by formalizing a general framework for side-channel attack analysis and security evaluation of cryptosystems. The proposed framework quantifies the effect of algorithmic and implementation characteristics on the success rate of the theoretically strongest maximum likelihood attack, revealing system-inherent SCA-related parameters for security improvement. The framework will extract maximum leakage from the observed measurement data in the black-box scenario, often the realistic situation for adversaries. State-of-the-art statistical methods are employed in the framework to precisely analyze and evaluate the overall side-channel leakage. This holistic framework will significantly alleviate the burden of security system architects, software developers, and hardware designers in their quest to build SCA security into systems they design, so as to ultimately yield provably secure hardware.