Doctoral Dissertation in Political Science: Deliberative Autocracy: How Single-Party Regimes Manage Liberalized Assemblies

政治学博士论文：协商独裁：一党政权如何管理自由化议会

• 批准号: 1324025
• 负责人: Philip Roeder
• 金额: $ 1万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-02-01 至 2015-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1324025&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Political; Science; Deliberative

This award satisfies Division B, Title V, Sec. 543 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-6, enacted on March 26, 2013).The project is directly related to US interests in democratization as it addresses how single party regimes create and control legislatures, focusing on Vietnam. Recent scholarship has argued for the importance of partially-liberalized legislatures in stabilizing power sharing and generating growth under authoritarian rule. This research leaves unresolved a fundamental commitment problem posed by partial liberalization, which is how legislators are prevented from using their public platform to mobilize a personal base of support. This project presents two novel arguments for how it is overcome. It shows that agenda control and strategic vetting are used to prevent debate from occurring on divisive issues while channeling debate towards areas where the regime desires feedback. These arguments are tested in Vietnam, which features a partially-liberalized legislature controlled by a single party. The project will rely on state-of-the-art automated text analysis techniques to analyze speeches made on the floor of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA) and interviews in the Vietnamese news media. It will also rely on qualitative data collected from interviews with Vietnamese officials and VNA delegates. Intellectual Merit: Understanding how authoritarian regimes can manage institutions to serve their interests is a critical issue in democratization and political stability. In the past decade, research has considered the importance of parliaments or elections in stabilizing authoritarian rule. This work will add depth to this agenda in two important ways. First, it exposes a previously unacknowledged dilemma that prevents regimes from reaping the rewards of authoritarian institutions. Second, through its theoretical argument, it also proposes how successful regimes protect themselves from this problem. This project will also be important to those interested in authoritarian durability more generally. In particular, it will help explain the empirical finding that single-party systems are more durable than other types of authoritarian regimes, such as military or personalistic regimes. This study suggests that single parties are strong because they are adept at organizing agenda control and vetting through parallel party institutions. Broader Impacts: This project will have several broader impacts outside of its theoretical contributions. For policy makers, it addresses a debate regarding the stability of partially-liberalized regimes. Policy makers debate whether or not to engage partially-liberalized regimes due to uncertainty about the democratizing effects of partial political reforms. By specifying the challenges facing regimes that attempt to liberalize, this project highlights factors suggesting that partial liberalization may not be easy to manage for authoritarian rulers. In short, while liberalization does not inevitably lead to democratization, it may nonetheless increase the likelihood of an eventual transition. The second broader impact of the project will be to deepen our understanding of the recent political history and political institutions of Vietnam, an important country to US national security interests. Since the normalization of relations with Vietnam in 1995 and the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2001, the relationship between Vietnam and the US has strengthened. As interest in the region, particularly regarding tensions in the South China Sea, has grown, Vietnam has become an increasingly important partner. This project will contribute by providing in-depth analysis of recent Vietnamese politics and institutions. It will also produce the first comprehensive digital archive and analysis of Vietnamese-language news articles and blogs.

该奖项满足司B，标题五，第。2013年综合和进一步持续拨款法案（P.L.）该项目直接关系到美国在民主化方面的利益，因为它涉及一党政权如何创建和控制立法机构，重点是越南。最近的学术界认为，在专制统治下，部分自由化的立法机构在稳定权力分享和促进增长方面具有重要意义。这项研究没有解决部分自由化所带来的一个根本承诺问题，即立法者如何被阻止利用其公共平台来动员个人支持基础。这个项目提出了两个新的论点，如何克服它。它表明，议程控制和战略审查被用来防止辩论发生在分裂的问题上，同时引导辩论到政权希望反馈的领域。这些论点在越南得到了检验，越南的特点是由一党控制的部分自由化立法机构。该项目将依靠最先进的自动文本分析技术来分析越南国会（VNA）的发言和越南新闻媒体的采访。它还将依靠从越南官员和越通社代表的访谈中收集的定性数据。智力优势：了解专制政权如何管理机构以服务于其利益，是民主化和政治稳定的关键问题。在过去十年中，研究考虑了议会或选举在稳定专制统治方面的重要性。这项工作将在两个重要方面增加这一议程的深度。首先，它暴露了一个以前未被承认的困境，这个困境阻止了政权从专制制度中获得回报。其次，通过理论论证，提出了成功的制度如何保护自己免受这一问题的影响。这个项目对于那些对独裁统治的持久性感兴趣的人来说也很重要。特别是，它将有助于解释经验发现，一党制比其他类型的独裁政权，如军事或个人主义政权更持久。这项研究表明，单一政党之所以强大，是因为他们善于通过平行的政党机构组织议程控制和审查。 更广泛的影响：该项目将在其理论贡献之外产生几个更广泛的影响。对于政策制定者来说，它解决了关于部分自由化政权稳定性的辩论。政策制定者争论是否要参与部分自由化的政权，因为部分政治改革的民主化效果不确定。通过具体说明试图自由化的政权所面临的挑战，该项目突出了表明部分自由化对专制统治者来说可能不容易管理的因素。简而言之，虽然自由化并不必然导致民主化，但它可能增加最终过渡的可能性。该项目的第二个更广泛的影响将是加深我们对越南近期政治历史和政治制度的理解，越南是美国国家安全利益的重要国家。自1995年与越南关系正常化和2001年签署双边贸易协定以来，越南与美国的关系得到加强。随着对该地区的兴趣，特别是对南中国海紧张局势的兴趣，越南已成为一个越来越重要的合作伙伴。该项目将通过提供对越南近期政治和制度的深入分析做出贡献。它还将产生第一个全面的数字档案和越南语新闻文章和博客的分析。