Direct and Indirect Impacts of Credit Scoring for Small and Medium Enterprises

信用评分对中小企业的直接和间接影响

• 批准号: 1326433
• 负责人: Dean Karlan
• 金额: $ 38.34万
• 依托单位: Innovations for Poverty Action
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-09-01 至 2015-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1326433&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Direct; Indirect; Impacts; Credit; Scoring

AbstractProposal Title: Direct and Indirect Impacts of Credit Scoring for Small and Medium EnterprisesProposal Number: SES - 1326433Principal Investigator: Dean KarlanLack of access to finance remains one of the core challenges to small firm growth in low- and middle-income countries. Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have high returns to capital but if banks cannot identify these borrowers, they may restrict lending or misallocate funds, limiting production and employment growth. Many low- and middle-income countries do not have credit bureaus or other effective public systems that aggregate information valuable for screening, further exacerbating the challenge of identifying high return borrowers. While a lack of adequate financing may constrain the expansion of individual firms, the provision of credit to a single business is likely to have spillover effects on other firms and on consumers. Firms operate in a web of competitors and suppliers, and these businesses will also be affected by credit that is provided to a single loan recipient. For example, standard economic theory suggests that competitor firms will see decreased demand when competitors gain access to credit. At the same time, increased demand for supplier inputs can lead to increased upstream profitability. Classic theories of economic development stress the importance of these linkages in the takeoff to development.This study uses a randomized controlled trial methodology to evaluate the impact of providing credit to SMEs, examining both the direct effects on recipient firms and the indirect spillover effects on competitors and firms linked to treated businesses through supply chains. A large development bank in the Philippines is implementing a new credit scoring system at 45 branches across the country. The new system will process all SME loans and assign a credit score to each loan applicant. Credit scores falling in a certain range below the cut-off for automatic loan approval will be randomly approved or denied. The randomized design generates exogenous variation in access to credit among SME loan applicants, enabling us to measure the impact of credit on firms. An important and innovative aspect of this evaluation is its focus on spillovers across firms. The project will measure vertical spillovers by surveying firms in the supply chains of loan applicants, and exploit variation in the number of firms receiving credit in different industries and markets to measure horizontal spillovers on firms competing directly with treatment and control businesses. Identifying competitor and supply chain markets and the horizontal and vertical interactions of sample firms constitutes a new approach to the study of firms in low- and middle-income countries. The findings are highly policy relevant. Evidence that providing credit to one firm has positive market spillovers, perhaps though increasing competition or allowing suppliers to invest more, would provide a strong justification for increasing access to credit. On the other hand, if gains to the firm receiving credit come entirely at the expense of losses to its competitors, then subsidized credit would accomplish little, suggesting that the gains from microcredit may be overestimated.

摘要提案标题：信用评分对中小企业的直接和间接影响提案编号：SES -1326433首席研究员：Dean Karlan缺乏融资渠道仍然是中低收入国家小企业发展面临的核心挑战之一。许多中小企业的资本回报率很高，但如果银行无法识别这些借款人，它们可能会限制贷款或不当分配资金，从而限制生产和就业增长。许多低收入和中等收入国家没有信用局或其他有效的公共系统来汇总对筛选有价值的信息，这进一步加剧了确定高回报借款人的挑战。 虽然缺乏足够的融资可能会限制单个企业的扩张，但向单个企业提供信贷可能会对其他企业和消费者产生溢出效应。 企业在竞争对手和供应商的网络中运作，这些企业也会受到提供给单一贷款接受者的信贷的影响。 例如，标准经济理论认为，当竞争对手获得信贷时，竞争对手的公司将看到需求下降。 与此同时，对供应商投入的需求增加可导致上游利润增加。 在经济发展的经典理论中，强调了这种关联在经济起飞和发展中的重要性。本研究采用随机对照试验方法，考察了向中小企业提供信贷对接受信贷的企业的直接影响，以及对竞争对手和通过供应链与接受信贷的企业建立联系的企业的间接溢出效应。 菲律宾一家大型开发银行正在全国45家分行实施新的信用评分系统。 新系统将处理所有中小企业贷款，并为每个贷款申请人分配一个信用评分。信用评分低于自动贷款审批截止值的一定范围将被随机批准或拒绝。 随机化设计产生的外生变量在中小企业贷款申请人之间获得信贷，使我们能够衡量信贷对企业的影响。 这一评价的一个重要和创新方面是其对公司间溢出效应的关注。该项目将通过调查贷款申请人供应链中的公司来衡量纵向溢出效应，并利用不同行业和市场中获得信贷的公司数量的差异来衡量对直接与处理和控制企业竞争的公司的横向溢出效应。确定竞争者和供应链市场以及样本公司的横向和纵向互动，是研究低收入和中等收入国家公司的一种新方法。 研究结果与政策高度相关。 有证据表明，向一家公司提供信贷可能会增加竞争或允许供应商增加投资，从而产生积极的市场溢出效应，这将为增加获得信贷的机会提供强有力的理由。另一方面，如果接受信贷的公司的收益完全是以其竞争对手的损失为代价的，那么补贴信贷将收效甚微，这表明小额信贷的收益可能被高估了。