Doctoral Dissertation Research: Political Stability in the Era of Global Capitalism

该项目旨在解释全球资本主义时代发展中国家的政治稳定是如何实现的。最近的土耳其政治史提供了一个独特的案例来测试和扩展关于这个问题的理论。从1989年到2002年，土耳其经历了11届连续政府。直到2000/2001年的经济危机改变了权力关系，导致不受欢迎的改革，导致正义与发展党当选，这一动荡时期才结束。自那时以来，JDP一直保持着其政治霸权，在过去13年中连续赢得压倒性胜利。为什么在20世纪90年代土耳其失去的十年中，短命的政府无法阻止各自政权的解体？目前的联合民主党是如何维持其自2002年以来的统治的？本研究假设：（1）银行部门和公共债务制度之间的动态系统地在统治精英之间产生冲突，阻碍了政党在20世纪90年代形成可行的联盟，（2）2001年经济危机后这些冲突的成功解决说明了JDP带来稳定的能力。本文以金融和国有资本关系为研究对象，试图探索一个被忽视的、但却具有潜在重要性的影响政治安排的因素。本研究采用定性研究方法，基于详细的个案比较历史社会学分析。该项目采用了两种被社会学家广泛使用的研究策略：对选定的国家机构和私人组织制作的档案材料进行广泛的历史调查，以及对土耳其政治和经济精英进行半结构化的深入访谈。结合这两个主要来源，我的目标不仅是要了解政治稳定的微观层面的动态，通过审查背后的激励精英如何达成（或未能达成）共识，在给定的经济约束和政治压力，但也发现更大的结构和制度的力量，在国家层面的政治决策过程的基础。因此，这项研究将产生可重复的，可推广的和可证伪的结果，因为调查结果和索赔可以测试对？匹配吗（正面或负面）历史上的情况和/或反事实的情况。该项目对财政如何影响选举政治和治理机构的分析，有可能就发展问题和民主治理做法提供可推广的政策建议。

This project seeks to explain how political stability in the developing world in the age of global capitalism is achieved. Recent Turkish political history provides a unique case to test and extend theories on this issue. Between 1989 and 2002, Turkey witnessed 11 consecutive governments. This tumultuous period ended only when the economic crises of 2000/2001 altered power relations, resulting in unpopular reforms that led to the election of the Justice and Development Party. The JDP has maintained its political hegemony since then, winning consecutive landslide victories over the last 13 years. Why were the short-lived governments of Turkey's lost decade of the 1990s unable to prevent the breakup of their respective regimes? How was it possible for the current JDP to maintain its rule since 2002? This research hypothesizes that: (1) The dynamics between the banking sector and the public debt regime systematically generated conflicts among the ruling elite, inhibiting political parties from forming viable coalitions during the 1990s, and that (2) the successful resolutions of these conflicts after the 2001 economic crisis account for the JDP's ability to bring about stability. With a focus on finance and state-capital relations, I seek to explore an overlooked, but potentially significant, factor shaping political arrangements.This project employs a qualitative research methodology, based on a detailed within-case comparative historical-sociological analysis. The project uses two research strategies that are widely used by sociologists: an extensive historical investigation of archived materials produced by selected state institutions and private organizations, and semi-structured in-depth interviews with political and economic elites in Turkey. Combining these two primary sources, I aim not only to understand micro-level dynamics of political stability by scrutinizing incentives behind how elites reach (or fail to reach) consensus under given economic constraints and political pressures, but also to discover larger structural and institutional forces underlying political decision-making processes at the state level. Therefore, this research will produce reproducible, generalizable and falsifiable results since the findings and claims can be tested against ?matching? (positive or negative) historically situated and/or counter-factual cases. The project's analysis of how finance shapes electoral politics and governing institutions can potentially offer generalizable policy suggestions concerning developmental issues and democratic governance practices.