Doctoral Dissertation Research: Political Stability in the Era of Global Capitalism

这个项目试图解释在全球资本主义时代，发展中国家是如何实现政治稳定的。土耳其近代政治史为检验和拓展有关这一问题的理论提供了一个独特的案例。1989至2002年间，土耳其连续11届政府。直到2000/2001年的经济危机改变了权力关系，导致不受欢迎的改革，导致正义与发展党当选，这段动荡的时期才结束。自那以后，JDP一直保持着政治霸权，在过去的13年里连续取得压倒性胜利。为什么上世纪90年代土耳其失落的十年的短暂政府无法阻止各自政权的解体？自2002年以来，目前的联合调查团怎么可能维持其统治？这项研究假设：(1)银行部门和公共债务制度之间的动态在统治精英中系统性地产生冲突，抑制了政党在20世纪90年代形成可行的联盟，以及(2)2001年经济危机后这些冲突的成功解决是正义与发展党带来稳定的能力的原因。以金融和国家-资本关系为重点，我试图探索一个被忽视但潜在重要的塑造政治安排的因素。本项目采用定性研究方法，基于详细的案例内部比较历史-社会学分析。该项目使用了社会学家广泛使用的两种研究策略：对选定的国家机构和私人组织制作的档案材料进行广泛的历史调查，以及对土耳其的政治和经济精英进行半结构化的深度采访。结合这两个主要来源，我的目标不仅是通过仔细审查精英们在给定的经济限制和政治压力下达成(或未能达成)共识背后的动机，了解政治稳定的微观动态，而且还旨在发现州一级政治决策过程背后更大的结构性和制度性力量。因此，这项研究将产生可重复性、可推广性和可证伪的结果，因为这些发现和主张可以针对匹配？(正面或负面)历史背景和/或反事实案件。该项目对财政如何影响选举政治和管理机构的分析可能会提供关于发展问题和民主治理做法的一般性政策建议。

This project seeks to explain how political stability in the developing world in the age of global capitalism is achieved. Recent Turkish political history provides a unique case to test and extend theories on this issue. Between 1989 and 2002, Turkey witnessed 11 consecutive governments. This tumultuous period ended only when the economic crises of 2000/2001 altered power relations, resulting in unpopular reforms that led to the election of the Justice and Development Party. The JDP has maintained its political hegemony since then, winning consecutive landslide victories over the last 13 years. Why were the short-lived governments of Turkey's lost decade of the 1990s unable to prevent the breakup of their respective regimes? How was it possible for the current JDP to maintain its rule since 2002? This research hypothesizes that: (1) The dynamics between the banking sector and the public debt regime systematically generated conflicts among the ruling elite, inhibiting political parties from forming viable coalitions during the 1990s, and that (2) the successful resolutions of these conflicts after the 2001 economic crisis account for the JDP's ability to bring about stability. With a focus on finance and state-capital relations, I seek to explore an overlooked, but potentially significant, factor shaping political arrangements.This project employs a qualitative research methodology, based on a detailed within-case comparative historical-sociological analysis. The project uses two research strategies that are widely used by sociologists: an extensive historical investigation of archived materials produced by selected state institutions and private organizations, and semi-structured in-depth interviews with political and economic elites in Turkey. Combining these two primary sources, I aim not only to understand micro-level dynamics of political stability by scrutinizing incentives behind how elites reach (or fail to reach) consensus under given economic constraints and political pressures, but also to discover larger structural and institutional forces underlying political decision-making processes at the state level. Therefore, this research will produce reproducible, generalizable and falsifiable results since the findings and claims can be tested against ?matching? (positive or negative) historically situated and/or counter-factual cases. The project's analysis of how finance shapes electoral politics and governing institutions can potentially offer generalizable policy suggestions concerning developmental issues and democratic governance practices.