Doctoral Dissertation Research: Political Stability in the Era of Global Capitalism

这个项目试图解释在全球资本主义时代，发展中国家的政治稳定是如何实现的。最近的土耳其政治史为检验和扩展这一问题的理论提供了一个独特的案例。从1989年到2002年，土耳其经历了连续11届政府。直到2000 - 2001年的经济危机改变了权力关系，导致不受欢迎的改革导致正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party）当选，这个动荡的时期才结束。自那以后，民主党一直保持着其政治霸权，在过去的13年里连续赢得压倒性的胜利。为什么土耳其在20世纪90年代“失去的十年”中短暂执政的政府无法阻止各自政权的解体？自2002年以来，现任自民党是如何维持其统治的呢？本研究假设：(1)银行业和公共债务制度之间的动态系统地产生了统治精英之间的冲突，抑制了政党在20世纪90年代形成可行的联盟；(2)2001年经济危机后这些冲突的成功解决说明了日本民主党带来稳定的能力。以金融和国家资本关系为重点，我试图探索一个被忽视的，但潜在重要的，影响政治安排的因素。本项目采用定性研究方法，基于详细的个案比较历史社会学分析。该项目采用社会学家广泛使用的两种研究策略：对选定的国家机构和私人组织制作的档案材料进行广泛的历史调查，以及对土耳其政治和经济精英进行半结构化的深入访谈。结合这两个主要来源，我的目标不仅是通过审查精英如何在给定的经济约束和政治压力下达成（或未能达成）共识背后的激励机制来理解政治稳定的微观动态，而且还发现国家层面政治决策过程背后更大的结构性和制度性力量。因此，这项研究将产生可重复的、可推广的和可证伪的结果，因为研究结果和主张可以针对“匹配”进行测试。（积极的或消极的）历史情境和/或反事实案例。该项目对金融如何影响选举政治和治理机构的分析可能会为发展问题和民主治理实践提供可概括的政策建议。

This project seeks to explain how political stability in the developing world in the age of global capitalism is achieved. Recent Turkish political history provides a unique case to test and extend theories on this issue. Between 1989 and 2002, Turkey witnessed 11 consecutive governments. This tumultuous period ended only when the economic crises of 2000/2001 altered power relations, resulting in unpopular reforms that led to the election of the Justice and Development Party. The JDP has maintained its political hegemony since then, winning consecutive landslide victories over the last 13 years. Why were the short-lived governments of Turkey's lost decade of the 1990s unable to prevent the breakup of their respective regimes? How was it possible for the current JDP to maintain its rule since 2002? This research hypothesizes that: (1) The dynamics between the banking sector and the public debt regime systematically generated conflicts among the ruling elite, inhibiting political parties from forming viable coalitions during the 1990s, and that (2) the successful resolutions of these conflicts after the 2001 economic crisis account for the JDP's ability to bring about stability. With a focus on finance and state-capital relations, I seek to explore an overlooked, but potentially significant, factor shaping political arrangements.This project employs a qualitative research methodology, based on a detailed within-case comparative historical-sociological analysis. The project uses two research strategies that are widely used by sociologists: an extensive historical investigation of archived materials produced by selected state institutions and private organizations, and semi-structured in-depth interviews with political and economic elites in Turkey. Combining these two primary sources, I aim not only to understand micro-level dynamics of political stability by scrutinizing incentives behind how elites reach (or fail to reach) consensus under given economic constraints and political pressures, but also to discover larger structural and institutional forces underlying political decision-making processes at the state level. Therefore, this research will produce reproducible, generalizable and falsifiable results since the findings and claims can be tested against ?matching? (positive or negative) historically situated and/or counter-factual cases. The project's analysis of how finance shapes electoral politics and governing institutions can potentially offer generalizable policy suggestions concerning developmental issues and democratic governance practices.