RAPID: Presidentialism, Democratic Collapse and the Potential Rise of a One-Party State.

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General SummaryThis study seeks to answer two questions: (1) what influences political elites to support and oppose a transformation from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential democracy and, (2) what influences political elites in a democracy to support or oppose a transition to a non-democratic one-party state. Existing theories explain elite preference for presidential systems as a result of political insecurity of ruling party elites and, ideological and policy radicalization among all political elites. Existing theories that seek to explain why democracies collapse assign the beliefs of ruling party elites regarding the security of their political power, structural factors such as poverty and ethnic radicalization and, international factors such as regional wars and foreign aid central roles in their theories. Political events in the last 25 years show that parties have been important in changing regimes and in undermining democracies. In this project, examines the questions of presidential choice and democratic collapse by surveying political elites--candidates aspiring to hold elected office in parliament in Turkey. Interviewing this set of MP candidates offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the incentive structures and decision-making process of parliamentary members who will decide the question of Turkey's transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential governance system. These elite-survey data on the beliefs, preferences and calculations allows for the testing of existing and new theories on parliamentarism/presidentialism and democratic collapse not possible previously because of lack of elite-level data. Technical SummaryIn this project, the PI proposes to collect elite-level survey data that will allow her to test existing and new theories related to two important questions: (1) what influences political elites to support and oppose a transformation from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential democracy and, (2) what influences political elites in a democracy to support or oppose a transition to a non-democratic one-party state. Extant research in the literatures on political institutions and democratic collapse identify the insecurity of ruling party elites regarding their grip on political powers, ideological and policy radicalization among elites and structural factors such as poverty and ethnic polarization as key determinants influencing elites to choose a presidential over parliamentary system and, to support a transition to a non-democratic regime. However, recent empirical trends towards legislating constitutional changes to facilitate transitions to presidentialism and to non-democratic regimes suggest that existing explanations under-theorize the role of political parties in these phenomena. Recent empirical trends also challenge existing theories that posit that disciplined parties ameliorate the incentives of presidential regimes to reverse democracy. This project tests existing theories of presidential choice and democratic collapse and new theories regarding the role political parties play in these phenomena by collecting otherwise unavailable elite-level data through a survey of parliamentary candidates in Turkey. The ruling AKP Party's proposal to change Turkey's parliamentary system to a presidential one is viewed as a means for the AKP to create a one-party autocracy. Through this elite-survey project the PI seeks to understand the incentive structure for both AKP-MP candidates and opposition party MP candidates in the parliamentary/presidential transition question. This research will help inform literature on the choice between parliamentary and presidential and also literature on the extension of presidential term of office.