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Stable Matching of Service Tours to Design Cooperative Policies for Transport Infrastructure Systems

服务行程稳定匹配设计交通基础设施系统合作政策

基本信息

批准号：
1634973
负责人：
Joseph Chow
金额：
$ 29.98万
依托单位：
New York University
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2016
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2016-09-01 至 2020-08-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1634973&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Stable Matching Service Tours Design

项目摘要

Transportation technologies have reached a point where they can no longer be evaluated as systems in isolation. Urban travel options have become increasingly abundant in today's age of ubiquitous data and information and communications technologies: e.g. ridesharing, vehicle/bike sharing, and demand-responsive transit. Coordination of mobility solutions between multiple agencies during disasters and large scale incidents is increasingly more challenging. The solution in this study involves a careful reexamination of the supply-demand assignment models for transportation networks. It combines stable matching theory with network analysis for transformative impacts on transportation planning and game theory as applied to infrastructure systems. Policy-makers will be able to design cooperative policies with different transport operators, such as fare bundling, service leasing, asset co-location, to further encourage partnerships like that of Kansas City and Bridj. The same methodology can be used for risk pooling of resources in planning for disasters. The project will support training of a number of graduate, undergraduate, and K-12 STEM students from under-represented minorities in transportation systems and game theory. It will drive innovation and entrepreneurship by defining new functional roles in transportation planning that would engage with startup companies and incubators.The study is split into two research thrusts. The first focuses on development of the core theory, which includes model formulation and algorithm development for traffic assignment as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game. Doing so would no longer assume that the transportation supply is fixed as in current methods. The model is then expanded to a many-to-many game to involve multiple operators so that cooperative policies between them can be evaluated. The second thrust focuses on applications of the theory, two of which are shared mobility systems and risk pooling strategies in disaster management. Customizations of the model to handle shared mobility services allow policymakers to evaluate specific shared mobility services like bike sharing or shared taxis. When the model is considered under uncertainty, cooperative strategies between multiple operators can be designed to pool risks together to minimize their impacts on individual operators. The study challenges over 60 years of research in transport modeling as an alternative theory of supply-demand interaction that considers both traveler and operator behavior.

交通技术已经到了不能再孤立地作为系统进行评估的地步。在当今数据和信息通信技术无处不在的时代，城市出行选择变得越来越丰富：例如拼车、车辆/自行车共享和需求响应型交通。在灾害和大规模事件期间协调多个机构之间的流动解决方案越来越具有挑战性。本研究的解决方案涉及对运输网络的供需分配模型进行仔细的重新检查。它结合了稳定匹配理论和网络分析对交通规划的变革影响，并将博弈论应用于基础设施系统。政策制定者将能够与不同的交通运营商设计合作政策，如票价捆绑、服务租赁、资产代管，以进一步鼓励像堪萨斯城和Bridj这样的合作伙伴关系。同样的方法也可用于灾害规划中资源的风险汇集。该项目将支持对一些来自代表不足的少数民族的研究生、本科生和K-12 STEM学生进行交通系统和博弈论方面的培训。它将通过定义交通规划中的新职能角色来推动创新和创业，这些职能将与初创公司和创业者接触。这项研究分为两个研究推动力。第一部分是核心理论的发展，包括交通分配作为多对一稳定匹配分配博弈的模型建立和算法开发。这样做将不再像目前的方法那样假设运输供应是固定的。然后将模型扩展到多对多博弈，以涉及多个运营商，从而可以评估它们之间的合作策略。第二个重点是该理论的应用，其中两个是共享移动系统和风险分担战略在灾害管理中的应用。对处理共享移动服务的模型进行定制，使政策制定者能够评估特定的共享移动服务，如共享单车或共享出租车。当模型在不确定情况下被考虑时，多个运营商之间的合作策略可以被设计为将风险集中在一起，以最小化它们对单个运营商的影响。这项研究挑战了60多年来在交通建模方面的研究，作为一种同时考虑出行者和运营商行为的供需相互作用的替代理论。