Collaborative Research: New Applications of Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: Mergers, Capacity Discipline and Price Rigidity

本研究探讨企业之间的信息不对称如何影响价格和消费者福利，以及如何改变反垄断政策来解释这些影响。 目前，几乎所有的市场分析-无论是量化市场力量还是进行反事实分析-都假定完全信息，即所有公司都确切地知道其竞争对手的需求、边际成本和目标。然而，如果企业更了解自己的地位，那么他们可能会试图利用他们的定价或容量选择来影响他们的竞争对手的信念，以影响这些竞争对手未来的行为。 一些简单的例子表明，即使是少量的不对称信息也会严重扭曲价格，并可能解释为什么价格在合并后会大幅上涨;为什么价格在菜单成本应该很小的情况下也会出现刚性;以及为什么一些行业，如航空公司，似乎会经历一段时间的容量纪律。 本研究将在理论、实证和方法上做出贡献。研究者首先描述了非合谋的马尔可夫完美贝叶斯均衡在多阶段寡头垄断定价，投标和容量选择游戏与不对称信息。该项目进一步开发了计算方法来解决这种平衡，这往往需要解决非常大量的微分方程。相关代码将提供给其他研究人员。调查人员还使用消费品包装的扫描数据和航空市场的容量投资数据来测试和校准模型。此外，该项目还分析了围绕实际合并的价格和公司行为的变化，以了解不对称信息是否可以解释为什么结果与反垄断当局在合并获得批准时的预期存在显着差异。最后，本研究培训研究生，使他们能够在自己的研究中使用这些和其他技术。

This research investigates how asymmetric information between firms can affect prices and consumer welfare, and how antitrust policies might be changed to account for these effects. Currently almost all analyses of markets -- whether to quantify market power or perform counterfactuals -- assume complete information, in which all firms know the demand, the marginal costs and the objectives of their rivals exactly. However, if firms know more about their own positions, then they might try to use their pricing or capacity choices to influence what their rivals believe in order to affect how those rivals might behave in the future. Some simple examples suggest that even small amounts of asymmetric information can distort prices significantly, and potentially explain why prices rise significantly after mergers; why prices appear rigid even when menu costs should be small; and, why some industries, such as airlines, appear to go through periods of capacity discipline. This research will make theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions. The investigators first characterize non-collusive Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibria in multi-period oligopoly pricing, bidding and capacity choice games with asymmetric information. The project further develops computational methods to solve such equilibria, which often require solving very large numbers of differential equations. The associated code will be made available to other researchers. The investigators also test and calibrate the models using scanner data on consumer packaged goods and data on capacity investments in airline markets. In addition, the project analyzes changes in prices and firm behavior around actual mergers to understand whether asymmetric information can explain why outcomes were significantly different from what the antitrust authorities expected when the mergers were approved. Lastly, this research trains graduate students so that they can use these and other techniques in their own research.