A Supply Side Rationale for Wage Floors: Evidence on Worker Collusion

摘要本研究项目将采用实地实验的方法来调查为什么即使失业率很高，工会存在薄弱或不存在，人们也不接受低于“市场工资”的工作机会。经济理论认为，高失业率会导致低工资，并诱使人们接受低工资的工作机会。实际上，这在发达国家和发展中国家都不会发生。劳动力市场无法自动适应高失业率，这可能是经济活动的微小波动导致严重萧条的原因之一。实验将在没有工会存在的印度农村地区进行，非正式压力可能是工人不愿接受低于“市场工资”的工作的唯一原因。这项研究的结果将使我们更好地了解劳动力市场，特别是低技能水平的劳动力市场是如何运作的，从而为政策制定者提供更好的选择，以制定更好的政策，减少美国和全球的失业。其结果将提高美国经济的竞争力，并减少贫困。这个研究项目将在350个印度村庄进行实地实验，研究非正式的群体制裁如何降低人们接受低于市场工资的工作机会的意愿。这些非正式的制裁可能会像工会一样产生工资下降的刚性和减少就业。这些实验的目的是在失业率高企的“淡季”，以低于市场的工资为工人提供就业机会。有些工作机会是“公开”的，这样同村的人就会知道工资很低，而有些工作机会是私下提供的。除了实地实验，该研究还将考察参与者是否愿意从自己的捐赠中拿出钱来减少其他接受低于市场工资工作的工人所获得的金额。一项试点研究的结果有力地表明，非正式制裁可以解释低收入社区的工资摩擦，即使在没有工会的情况下也是如此。这个研究项目的结果将帮助我们更好地理解低收入社区劳动力市场的运作，这是经济学家长期以来一直无法理解的。研究结果还将指导决策者制定更有效的政策，减少失业和贫困，提高经济的生产力和竞争力。

AbstractThis research project will use field experiments to investigate why people do not accept job offers at below "market wages" even when unemployment rates are very high and labor union presence is either weak or non-existent. Economic theory suggests that high unemployment rates should lead to lower wages and induce people to accept job offers at these lower wages. In practice, this does not happen either in the developed world or developing world. The inability of labor markets to automatically adjust to high unemployment rates may be one of the reasons why small fluctuations in economic activity lead to serious depressions. The experiments will be conducted in rural India where there is no labor union presence, and informal pressure may be the only reason why workers may not to take jobs offered below "market wages". The results of this research will provide us with a better understanding of how labor market, especially at the lower skill level, functions and thus provide policy makers options to craft better policies to reduce unemployment in the U.S. and around the globe. The results will thus improve the competitiveness of the US economy as well as reduce poverty.This research project will use field experiments in 350 Indian villages to study how informal group sanctions can reduce the willingness to accept job offers below the market wage. These informal sanctions may function as labor unions do to generate downward wage rigidities and reduce employment. The experiments are designed to provide employment to workers at below market wages during the "lean" season when unemployment is high. Some job offers will be made in "public" so that co-villagers are aware of the low wage offer while some offers are made in private. In addition to the field experiments, the study will also examine whether participants are willing to give away money from their own endowments to reduce the amount received by other workers who have accepted work at below market wages. The results of a pilot study strongly suggest that informal sanctions can explain wage frictions in low income communities, even in the absence of labor unions. The results of this research project will help us better understand the functioning of labor markets in low income communities, something that has eluded economists for a long time. The results will also guide policy makers in crafting more efficient policies in reducing unemployment, poverty, and making economies more productive and competitive.