Collaborative Research: Theoretical Impact of Acquisition Mechanisms on System Design Outcomes Under Uncertainty

该项目将探索大型复杂系统开发中大规模成本超支的原因和解决方法，如新飞机，航天器，武器系统或新能源发电厂。美国国防部报告说，超支、延误和取消相当于每天2亿美元的价值损失，太空计划、商用飞机、核电站和原型聚变电站也经历了类似的超支。这些损失大部分是由于工程过程造成的，但工程过程通常是对客户或政府合同的回应。不同形式的合同可以带来不同的流程，从而允许设计和开发技术上雄心勃勃的系统，而不会造成太大损失。这不仅可以节省时间和金钱，还可以让更多的项目进行尝试，加快技术发展的速度，加速我们国家的经济增长。这个项目有可能成为改变联邦采购过程的基础，最终可能导致每天节省超过1亿美元。这个研究项目的目标是测试这样一个假设，即在大型复杂工程系统中，从技术风险和复杂性到成本和进度超支的机制是需求向下流动的系统工程过程，受基于需求的合同的激励。该项目将使用工程组织的模拟来探索这一假设。虽然许多其他人已经应用委托代理理论承包，有些人已经探讨了工程组织内的委托代理理论，这是第一个项目，研究如何优化激励合同，影响系统工程结构的设计工作在一个大型工程组织。这是合同的相互作用和系统工程的方式进行，标志着真正的新领域，在这项研究。本计画探讨四个研究问题：1）成本补偿、奖酬、奖励与计画成果之间的因果关系为何？2)这种关系如何受到工业工程组织（包括供应链）的结构复杂性和规模的影响？3)这种关系如何受到项目不确定性，特别是技术风险的影响？4)这种关系如何受到用户环境中的不确定性的影响，也就是说，受到人工制品属性与政府利益之间关系的一年中的变化的影响？对这些问题的探讨将揭示出与系统工程中的收购有关的理论问题，而这些问题在今天还很难被理解。

This project will explore the causes and cures for massive cost overruns in large complex system developments, such as new airplanes, spacecraft, weapon systems or novel energy power plants. The U.S. Department of Defense reports overruns, delays and cancellations equivalent to $200 million per day in lost value, and similar overruns are experienced by space programs, commercial aircraft, nuclear power plants, and prototype fusion power plants. Much of these losses are due to engineering processes, but engineering processes are usually a response to customer or government contracts. Different forms of contracts can bring about different processes, allowing technically ambitious systems to be designed and developed without large losses. Not only can this save time and money, it will also allow more projects to be attempted, accelerating the speed of technology development and accelerating our nation's economic growth. This project has the potential to be the basis of change in the Federal acquisition process that could ultimately result in savings exceeding $100 million per day.The objective of this research project is to test the hypothesis that the mechanism that leads from technical risk and complexity to cost and schedule overruns in large complex engineered systems is the systems engineering process of requirements flow-down, stimulated by requirements-based contracts. The project will use simulations of engineering organizations to explore the hypothesis. While many others have applied principle agent theory to contracting, and some have explored principle agent theory within engineering organizations, this is the first project to investigate how to optimize incentive contracts to affect the systems engineering structure of design work within a large engineering organization. It is the interaction of the contract and the way systems engineering is conducted that marks truly new ground in this research. The project explores four research questions: 1) What is the causal relationship among cost reimbursement, award fees, incentives, and project outcomes? 2) How is this relationship affected by the structural complexity and size of the industry engineering organization, including the supply chain? 3) How is this relationship affected by program uncertainty, particularly technical risk? 4) How is this relationship affected by uncertainty in the user environment, that is, by out year changes in the relationship of artifact attributes to government benefit? Answering these questions will expose theoretical issues pertaining to acquisitions in systems engineering that are poorly understood today.