Collaborative Research: Data-driven Mechanism Design for Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges

协作研究：数据驱动的组合拍卖和交易机制设计

• 批准号: 1761163
• 负责人: Benjamin Lubin
• 金额: $ 27.74万
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-08-15 至 2022-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1761163&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Data; driven; Mechanism

This award promises to contribute to the nation's economic prosperity by improving the efficiency of market mechanisms. Market mechanisms increase the welfare of market participants by enabling the transfer of goods and services from those who ascribe a low value to their holdings to those who ascribe a higher value to them. Combinatorial auctions and exchanges are market mechanisms that allow agents to specify preferences (via bids and offers) over bundles of assets (goods, services, rights). The value of an item may depend on whether an agent owns a different item, so the value of a bundle of items may differ from the sum of the values of individual items in the bundle. There are many important domains where the need for such mechanisms arise, such as wireless spectrum markets, which transfer radio spectrum rights from governments to mobile phone carriers and between carriers, truckload transportation, and the leasing market for cloud computing resources. Each of these markets involves the transfer of billions of dollars, and in many cases, the assets are publicly owned. The project will involve undergraduate and graduate student training, and will also support the outreach activities of the PIs in organizing college student volunteers to teach STEM subjects to inner-city K-12 public school students. As there are multiple design objectives in the construction of market mechanisms (efficiency, revenue, incentives, simplicity, etc.), there is no single perfect market design involving combinatorial values. Instead, there is a substantial literature in which a large variety of designs have been suggested. What is missing from this literature, however, is a sound methodology for comparing competing designs under realistic models of participants' values. This project addresses this shortcoming by creating a simulation platform that will support data-driven comparisons of combinatorial market designs in the spectrum auction and cloud computing domains. This platform will be open and accessible to the research community, practitioners, and public agencies to rigorously evaluate existing market designs, variations on those designs, and entirely new designs, and to definitively point to features that render some designs better than others in their chosen application domains.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项承诺通过提高市场机制的效率，为国家的经济繁荣做出贡献。市场机制增加了市场参与者的福利，使商品和服务从那些认为其持有价值较低的人转移到那些认为其持有价值较高的人。组合拍卖和交易是一种市场机制，它允许代理人对大量资产（商品、服务、权利）指定偏好（通过出价和出价）。物品的价值可能取决于代理是否拥有不同的物品，因此一束物品的价值可能不同于捆绑中单个物品的价值总和。有许多重要领域需要这种机制，例如无线频谱市场（将无线电频谱权从政府转让给移动电话运营商以及在运营商之间转让）、卡车运输和云计算资源租赁市场。这些市场中的每一个都涉及数十亿美元的转移，在许多情况下，这些资产是公共所有的。该项目将包括本科生和研究生培训，并将支持pi组织大学生志愿者向市中心K-12公立学校学生教授STEM课程的外展活动。由于市场机制的构建存在多重设计目标（效率、收益、激励、简单性等），不存在单一的、包含组合价值的完美市场设计。相反，有大量的文献提出了各种各样的设计。然而，这些文献中缺少的是在参与者价值观的现实模型下比较竞争设计的可靠方法。该项目通过创建一个仿真平台来解决这一缺陷，该平台将支持频谱拍卖和云计算领域组合市场设计的数据驱动比较。这个平台将对研究团体、从业者和公共机构开放，以严格评估现有的市场设计、这些设计的变化和全新的设计，并明确指出在其选定的应用领域中使某些设计优于其他设计的特征。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach

设计核心选择支付规则：一种计算搜索方法

• DOI: 10.1287/isre.2022.1108
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Information Systems Research
• 影响因子: 4.9
• 作者: Bünz, Benedikt;Lubin, Benjamin;Seuken, Sven
• 通讯作者: Seuken, Sven

Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification

• DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.11525
• 发表时间: 2018-12
• 期刊: ArXiv
• 作者: Vitor Bosshard;Benedikt Bünz;Benjamin Lubin;Sven Seuken

Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

基于傅立叶分析的迭代组合拍卖

• DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/78
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
• 作者: Weissteiner, Jakob;Wendler, Chris;Seuken, Sven;Lubin, Ben;Püschel, Markus
• 通讯作者: Püschel, Markus

iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding

iMLCA：机器学习驱动的迭代组合拍卖与区间竞价

• DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467535
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
• 作者: Beyeler, Manuel;Brero, Gianluca;Lubin, Benjamin;Seuken, Sven
• 通讯作者: Seuken, Sven