Collaborative Research: Data-driven Mechanism Design for Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges

协作研究：数据驱动的组合拍卖和交易机制设计

• 批准号: 1761546
• 负责人: Amy Greenwald
• 金额: $ 33.99万
• 依托单位: Brown University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-08-15 至 2022-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1761546&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Data; driven; Mechanism

This award promises to contribute to the nation's economic prosperity by improving the efficiency of market mechanisms. Market mechanisms increase the welfare of market participants by enabling the transfer of goods and services from those who ascribe a low value to their holdings to those who ascribe a higher value to them. Combinatorial auctions and exchanges are market mechanisms that allow agents to specify preferences (via bids and offers) over bundles of assets (goods, services, rights). The value of an item may depend on whether an agent owns a different item, so the value of a bundle of items may differ from the sum of the values of individual items in the bundle. There are many important domains where the need for such mechanisms arise, such as wireless spectrum markets, which transfer radio spectrum rights from governments to mobile phone carriers and between carriers, truckload transportation, and the leasing market for cloud computing resources. Each of these markets involves the transfer of billions of dollars, and in many cases, the assets are publicly owned. The project will involve undergraduate and graduate student training, and will also support the outreach activities of the PIs in organizing college student volunteers to teach STEM subjects to inner-city K-12 public school students. As there are multiple design objectives in the construction of market mechanisms (efficiency, revenue, incentives, simplicity, etc.), there is no single perfect market design involving combinatorial values. Instead, there is a substantial literature in which a large variety of designs have been suggested. What is missing from this literature, however, is a sound methodology for comparing competing designs under realistic models of participants' values. This project addresses this shortcoming by creating a simulation platform that will support data-driven comparisons of combinatorial market designs in the spectrum auction and cloud computing domains. This platform will be open and accessible to the research community, practitioners, and public agencies to rigorously evaluate existing market designs, variations on those designs, and entirely new designs, and to definitively point to features that render some designs better than others in their chosen application domains.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项承诺通过提高市场机制的效率，为国家的经济繁荣做出贡献。市场机制增加了市场参与者的福利，使商品和服务能够从那些认为其所持资产价值较低的人转移到那些认为其所持资产价值较高的人手中。组合拍卖和交易所是一种市场机制，允许代理人指定(通过出价和要约)对资产(商品、服务、权利)捆绑的偏好。物品的价值可能取决于代理是否拥有不同的物品，因此捆绑物品的价值可能不同于捆绑物品中单个物品的价值总和。有许多重要的领域需要这种机制，例如无线频谱市场，它将无线电频谱权利从政府转让给移动电话运营商和运营商之间，卡车运输，以及云计算资源租赁市场。这些市场中的每一个都涉及数十亿美元的转移，而且在许多情况下，资产都是公共所有的。该项目将包括本科生和研究生培训，并将支持PIS组织大学生志愿者向市中心K-12公立学校的学生教授STEM科目的外联活动。由于市场机制的构建有多个设计目标(效率、收益、激励、简单性等)，因此不存在单一的涉及组合价值的完美市场设计。相反，有大量的文献提出了各种各样的设计方案。然而，这些文献中缺少的是一种合理的方法，用于在参与者价值观的现实模型下比较相互竞争的设计。该项目通过创建一个模拟平台来解决这一缺陷，该平台将支持频谱拍卖和云计算领域中组合市场设计的数据驱动比较。这个平台将向研究社区、从业者和公共机构开放和访问，以严格评估现有的市场设计、这些设计的变体和全新的设计，并明确指出在他们选择的应用领域中使某些设计比其他设计更好的功能。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games

• DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2205.12031
• 发表时间: 2021-02
• 期刊: ArXiv
• 作者: Dustin Morrill;Ryan D'Orazio;Marc Lanctot;J. R. Wright;Michael H. Bowling;A. Greenwald

Hindsight and Sequential Rationality of Correlated Play

• DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16702
• 发表时间: 2020-12
• 期刊: ArXiv
• 作者: Dustin Morrill;Ryan D'Orazio;Reca Sarfati;Marc Lanctot;James Wright;A. Greenwald;Michael H. Bowling

Learning Competitive Equilibria in Noisy Combinatorial Markets

• DOI: 10.5555/3463952.3464120
• 发表时间: 2021-01
• 作者: Enrique Areyan Viqueira;Cyrus Cousins;A. Greenwald