SaTC: CORE: Medium: Collaborative: Countermeasures Against Side-Channels Attacks Targeting Hardware and Embedded System Implementations of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms

SaTC：核心：中：协作：针对后量子密码算法的硬件和嵌入式系统实现的侧通道攻击对策

• 批准号: 1801341
• 负责人: Reza Azarderakhsh
• 金额: $ 45万
• 依托单位: Florida Atlantic University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-10-01 至 2023-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1801341&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Medium; Collaborative; Countermeasures

Quantum computers are believed to have a potential to perform specialized calculations beyond the reach of any supercomputer in existence today, threatening today's major public-key cryptography standards. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is devoted to the design and analysis of cryptographic algorithms that are resistant against any known attacks using quantum computers, but by themselves can be implemented using classical computing platforms, based on current semiconductor technologies. This project aims to develop effective methods of protecting the implementations of emerging PQC schemes against powerful side-channel attacks based on exploiting power consumption of cryptographic devices and/or intentional transient faults affecting their operation.The algorithms to be investigated represent several major PQC families and three major categories of public-key cryptography applications: encryption, digital signature, and key encapsulation mechanism. The goal of the project is to determine the cost of effective countermeasures against power and fault attacks in terms of the commonly accepted software and hardware performance metrics. The research thrusts will (i) investigate the effects of countermeasures against fault attacks on resiliency to power attacks, and (ii) propose solutions to achieve combined fault and power analysis resiliency. The project will involve several significant extensions to preliminarily-developed experimental platform: Flexible Open-source workBench fOr Side-channel analysis (FOBOS).Power and fault attacks are real threats to practical implementation of PQC and may significantly thwart the successful transition to new standards. This project will investigate systematic, long-term study of countermeasures against these attacks, which may make transition to PQC more secure, benefiting Internet users worldwide. The outreach activities will include motivational lectures at high schools, promoting and supervising undergraduate research, and organizing a series of international competitions for graduate students. The knowledge and experience gained will be integrated into several course modules, developed jointly by all investigators and shared on-line.It is expected that multiple algorithms, computer-aided design tools, software programs, and hardware designs will be developed throughout the project period. Project deliverables will be made available to researchers and educators in the non-profit sector, such as universities, research institutions, and government laboratories. To make it easy to maintain, disseminate, and distribute code and data from this project, a single server will be dedicated to keeping all the draft and final copies of the deliverables. This server will be maintained through the project period and additional five years beyond. The project website will be continuously available at http://www.pqcSCA.com.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

据信，量子计算机有潜力执行当今现存的任何超级计算机超出范围的专业计算，威胁到当今的主要公开密码标准。量词后密码学（PQC）致力于使用量子计算机抵抗任何已知攻击的加密算法的设计和分析，但是基于当前的半导体技术，可以使用经典计算平台来实施任何已知的攻击。 This project aims to develop effective methods of protecting the implementations of emerging PQC schemes against powerful side-channel attacks based on exploiting power consumption of cryptographic devices and/or intentional transient faults affecting their operation.The algorithms to be investigated represent several major PQC families and three major categories of public-key cryptography applications: encryption, digital signature, and key encapsulation mechanism.该项目的目的是根据普遍接受的软件和硬件性能指标来确定针对权力和故障攻击的有效对策的成本。研究推力将（i）研究反对故障攻击对电力攻击的弹性的对策的影响，（ii）提出解决方案以实现合并的断层和功率分析弹性。该项目将涉及初步开发的实验平台的几项重大扩展：灵活的开源工作台进行侧通道分析（FOBOS）。功率和故障攻击是对PQC实际实施的真正威胁，并且可能会大大阻止成功过渡到新标准。该项目将调查针对这些攻击的对策的系统，长期研究，这可能会使向PQC的过渡更加安全，从而使全球互联网用户受益。外展活动将包括高中的动机讲座，促进和监督本科研究，并为研究生组织一系列国际比赛。所获得的知识和经验将集成到几个课程模块中，所有研究人员共同开发并在线共享。预计将在整个项目期间开发多种算法，计算机辅助设计工具，软件程序和硬件设计。项目可交付成果将提供给非营利部门的研究人员和教育者，例如大学，研究机构和政府实验室。为了使其易于维护，传播和分发该项目的代码和数据，一台服务器将专门用于保留可交付成果的所有草稿和最终副本。该服务器将在项目期间和五年后维护。该项目网站将在http：//www.pqccsca.com..com.....c.....ry奖中不断获得，该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响评估标准通过评估来提供支持的。

项目成果

A Monolithic Hardware Implementation of Kyber: Comparing Apples to Apples in PQC Candidates

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-88238-9_6
• 发表时间: 2021
• 作者: Mojtaba Bisheh-Niasar;R. Azarderakhsh;Mehran Mozaffari Kermani

Further Optimizations of CSIDH: A Systematic Approach to Efficient Strategies, Permutations, and Bound Vectors

CSIDH 的进一步优化：高效策略、排列和绑定向量的系统方法

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-57808-4_24
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: 18th International Conference Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2020
• 作者: Hutchinson, Aaron;LeGrow, Jason;Koziel, Brian;Azarderakhsh, Reza
• 通讯作者: Azarderakhsh, Reza

How Not to Create an Isogeny-Based PAKE

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-57808-4_9
• 发表时间: 2020-10
• 作者: R. Azarderakhsh;David Jao;Brian Koziel;Jason T. LeGrow;Vladimir Soukharev;Oleg Taraskin

ARMv8 SIKE: Optimized Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation on ARMv8 Processors

• DOI: 10.1109/tcsi.2019.2920869
• 发表时间: 2019-07
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers
• 作者: A. Jalali;R. Azarderakhsh;Mehran Mozaffari Kermani;Matthew J. Campagna;David Jao

EdSIDH: Supersingular Isogeny Die-Hellman Key Exchange on Edwards Curves

EdSIDH：Edwards 曲线上的超奇异同源 Die-Hellman 密钥交换

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-05072-6_8
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: and Applied Cryptography Engineering
• 作者: Azarderakhsh, Reza;Lang, B Elena;Jao, David;Koziel, Brian
• 通讯作者: Koziel, Brian