Dynamic Pricing and Matching with Asymmetric Information

该奖项资助两个经济理论项目的研究。第一个问题考察了垄断者将如何随着时间的推移选择价格，重点是产品市场的垄断力如何影响公司随着时间的推移对生产技术的决策。第二个项目是机制设计的一般领域，即资源分配方法的设计。具体的应用是在不完全信息下的匹配市场，这项工作可以给我们提供新的思路，如何设计出能够导致稳定结果的分配方法。这项研究通过开发新的方法来推进科学，这些方法可以用来分析从是否监管耐用品垄断者到劳动力市场如何更好地帮助雇主找到合适的员工的情况。第一个项目探索在具有一般市场需求和生产技术的环境中垄断者的动态定价策略。其目的是刻画垄断力量和生产技术之间的关系，并研究动态模型中的消费者和生产者剩余与静态模型中的剩余有何不同。这项工作将为快速增长的关于耐用品动态定价的经验经济学文献提供一个新的和更广泛的基础。第二个项目旨在推进对不完全信息匹配市场的核心和稳定性的研究。研究议程包括提供现有概念的实际相关细化，找到两两稳定概念的动态博弈基础，表征核心和稳定之间的精确关系，以及分析各种环境中的稳定匹配，例如那些具有昂贵投资和隐藏类型的环境。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This award funds research on two projects in economic theory. The first examines how a monopolist will choose prices over time, with a focus on how monopoly power in the product market affects how the firm makes decisions over time about production technologies. The second project is in the general area of mechanism design, the design of methods to allocate recourses. The specific application is in matching markets under incomplete information, and the work could give us new ideas about how to design allocation methods that will lead to stable outcomes. The research advances science by developing new methods that can be used to analyze situations from whether to regulate a durable goods monopolist to how labor markets can do a better job of helping employers find the right employees.The first project explores dynamic pricing strategies of monopolists in environments with general market demands and production technologies. The goal is to characterize the relationship between monopoly power and production technology, and study how the consumer and producer surpluses in dynamic models differ from the static model. This work will provide a new and more general foundation for the fast growing literature in empirical economics on dynamic pricing of durable goods. The second project seeks to advance the study of the core and stability in matching markets with incomplete information. The research agenda includes offering practically relevant refinements of existing concepts, finding dynamic game foundations of the concept of pairwise stability, characterizing the precise relationship between the core and stability, and analyzing stable matchings in various environments such as those with costly investment and hidden types.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.