EAGER:Experimental Deployment of the ARTEMIS BGP Hijacking Detection Prototype in Research and Educational Networks

EAGER：ARTEMIS BGP 劫持检测原型在研究和教育网络中的实验部署

• 批准号: 1848641
• 负责人: Alberto Dainotti
• 金额: $ 18.5万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-09-01 至 2019-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1848641&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: EAGER; Experimental; Deployment; ARTEMIS; BGP

The Internet suffers from a design flaw affecting the security of global routing, exposing it to a class of large-scale attacks that can cause significant portions of network traffic to be diverted across the globe. The potential impact of these attacks - known as BGP hijacking - can range from massive eavesdropping to identity spoofing or selective content modification. In addition, executing such attacks does not require access or proximity to the affected links and networks, posing increasing risks to national security. Recently, researchers at CAIDA, UC San Diego, proposed a novel methodology (called ARTEMIS) to detect and mitigate BGP hijacking attacks that is radically different from the state of the art but that network operators find promising and more in line with their needs. In this project, researchers carry out a first experimental assisted deployment of ARTEMIS in few selected operator networks supporting education, research and other no-profit activities in the US. This project significantly contributes to transitioning from a prototype mainly based on theoretical foundations and controlled experiments into a real platform that can be practically used by operators to secure their networks. The project also contributes to improving the security of networks participating in the project, with an immediate positive effect on the security of infrastructure critical to our society. This project is a collaboration among researchers and selected research and education network operators to carry out an experimental deployment of ARTEMIS detection and mitigation techniques in their networks. The main goals of such experimentation are: i) to evaluate the ARTEMIS methods and their implementation in real operational scenarios; ii) to learn and address real deployment technical issues; iii) to train operators in the use of the tool and contribute to improve the security of their networks.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

互联网存在影响全球路由安全的设计缺陷，使其面临一类大规模攻击，可能导致大部分网络流量在全球范围内转移。 这些攻击（称为 BGP 劫持）的潜在影响范围包括大规模窃听、身份欺骗或选择性内容修改。此外，执行此类攻击不需要访问或接近受影响的链路和网络，这对国家安全构成了越来越大的风险。最近，加州大学圣地亚哥分校 CAIDA 的研究人员提出了一种新颖的方法（称为 ARTEMIS）来检测和减轻 BGP 劫持攻击，该方法与现有技术完全不同，但网络运营商发现该方法很有前途并且更符合他们的需求。 在该项目中，研究人员在少数选定的运营商网络中首次进行了 ARTEMIS 的实验辅助部署，以支持美国的教育、研究和其他非营利活动。 该项目极大地促进了从主要基于理论基础和受控实验的原型转变为运营商可以实际使用以保护其网络安全的真实平台。 该项目还有助于提高参与该项目的网络的安全性，对我们社会至关重要的基础设施的安全产生直接的积极影响。该项目是研究人员与选定的研究和教育网络运营商之间的合作，旨在在其网络中实验性部署 ARTEMIS 检测和缓解技术。 此类实验的主要目标是： i) 评估 ARTEMIS 方法及其在实际操作场景中的实施； ii) 学习并解决实际的部署技术问题； iii) 培训运营商如何使用该工具，并为提高其网络安全性做出贡献。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。