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Political Oversight of the Ministerial Bureaucracy from the Perspective of Principal-Agent-Theory. Institutional Design, formal Models and laboratory-experimental Examination.

委托代理理论视角下的部级官僚政治监督。

基本信息

批准号：
238042112
负责人：
Professor Dr. Susumu Shikano
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2013
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2012-12-31 至 2016-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/238042112?language=en
关键词：
Political Oversight Ministerial Bureaucracy Perspective

项目摘要

The goal of this project is to formalize the impact of different institutional designs of the delegation relationship between politicians and ministerial bureaucrats based on the principal-agent theory and to examine the empirical validity of these models in series of laboratory experiments. Against these predictions, we consider individual motives and repeated interaction as potential sources for cooperative behavior in delegation situations.The relationship between political leaders and ministerial bureaucrats has been described as a delegation relationship characterized by information asymmetries. Principal-agent theory shifts the analytical focus from the effective implementation of public policies towards the efficient implementation of policies by establishing incentive-compatible institutional environments for self-interested bureaucrats. Crucial to the success of this realignment is the validity of the motivational assumptions made by principal-agent scholars. Contrary to the paradigm of rational self-interested actors, both, bureaucrats individual motivation and cooperative solutions of principal-agent constellations in the context of repeated interaction are discussed controversially in the current literature. This project focusses on the question of whether the principal-agent theory provides a reliable explanation for the behavior of political and bureaucratic leaders in delegation situations. How does the institutional design of the delegation relationship, individual motives and repeated interaction affect bureaucratic service delivery? To answer these questions, we will proceed in three steps. Building on previous work by Shikano & Tepe (2012), the general principal-agent framework is transferred and applied to the specifics of the delegation relationship between ministers and secretaries of state in three formal models (Variant 1: a single principal and ideological agents; Variant 2: a single agent and ideological principals; Variant 3: delegation chain with ideological principals). In the second step, these formal models are solved analytically assuming fully rational individuals. In the third step, the game theoretical predictions derived from these three models are tested in series of laboratory experiments on student subject pools.Empirical evidence, gained in other laboratory experiments, tends to challenge the assumption of fully rational individuals. In order to assess the extent to which differences between the game-theoretical prediction and the experimental results can be attributed to individual work motives and subject-pool-effects, we take a twofold approach. First, we measure the Public Service Motivation of our subjects after the experimental sessions. Second, the experimental sessions are conducted with civil servants from state ministries using a mobile computer laboratory.

本研究的目的是基于委托代理理论，对政治家和部长级官僚之间委托关系的不同制度设计的影响进行形式化分析，并通过一系列实验室实验，检验这些模型的实证有效性。针对这些预测，我们认为，个人动机和重复互动的合作行为在委托情况下的潜在来源。政治领导人和部长级官僚之间的关系已被描述为一个委托关系，其特征是信息不对称。委托代理理论通过为自利官僚建立激励相容的制度环境，将分析重点从公共政策的有效执行转向政策的有效执行。这种重新组合成功的关键是委托代理学者所做的动机假设的有效性。与理性自利行为者范式相反，官僚个人动机和重复互动背景下的委托代理星座合作解决方案在当前文献中存在争议。这个项目的重点是委托代理理论是否提供了一个可靠的解释的政治和官僚领导人在委托情况下的行为的问题。授权关系、个人动机和重复互动的制度设计如何影响官僚服务提供？为了回答这些问题，我们将分三步进行。在Shikano & Tepe（2012）的基础上，将一般的委托代理框架转换为三种正式模式（变式1：单一委托人和意识形态代理人;变式2：单一代理人和意识形态委托人;变式3：意识形态委托人的委托链），并将其应用于大臣和国务卿之间的委托关系。在第二步中，这些正式的模型解析求解假设完全理性的个人。在第三步中，从这三个模型得出的博弈理论预测在一系列实验室实验中进行了测试，在其他实验室实验中获得的经验证据，往往挑战完全理性的个人的假设。为了评估游戏理论预测和实验结果之间的差异在多大程度上可以归因于个人的工作动机和主题池效应，我们采取了双重的方法。首先，在实验结束后，我们测量了被试的公共服务动机。第二，使用移动的计算机实验室与国家部委的公务员进行实验课程。