Phase I IUCRC University of Cincinnati: Center for Hardware and Embedded System Security and Trust (CHEST)

第一阶段 IUCRC 辛辛那提大学：硬件和嵌入式系统安全与信任中心 (CHEST)

• 批准号: 1916722
• 负责人: John Emmert
• 金额: $ 75万
• 依托单位: University of Cincinnati Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-10-01 至 2025-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1916722&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Phase; IUCRC; University; Cincinnati; Center

The Center for Hardware and Embedded Systems Security and Trust (CHEST) coordinates university-based research with needs of industry and government partners to advance knowledge of security, assurance, and trust for electronic hardware and embedded systems. Interests of CHEST include identification, detection, monitoring, mitigation, and elimination of vulnerabilities that affect hardware and embedded systems. The CHEST Center addresses a range of attack vectors across design, operation, manufacturing, supply chains, and integration of the hardware, software, and firmware to a variety of systems. The Center is inventing and disseminating technologies, practices, and guidelines to stakeholders and educating a next generation of experts.The NSF CHEST Center addresses security, assurance, and trust across several levels: Large-scale systems, embedded systems, design and operations, requirements, standards, manufacturing, supply chains, and integrated circuits and boards. Among the universities, the University of Cincinnati will lead CHEST efforts for hardware and embedded system security and trust at the circuit level. Topics include methods for designing, detecting, avoiding, mitigating, and protecting against malicious attacks: (i) side channel attack avoidance and mitigation; (ii) split manufacturing and additive components for HW integrity monitoring; and (iii) hardware acceleration for enhancing encryption/obfuscation, camouflaging, split manufacturing, Trojan detection, reverse engineering, and watermarking applications.Security, assurance, and trust of integrated cyber-physical systems enable meeting fundamental human needs, along with supporting broader social, environmental, and economic progress of the nation. The ability of systems to absorb disruptive shocks and recover with minimal loss is key to protecting human lives and property. The NSF CHEST Center influences the practices of industry, government, and the military in design, protection, and resilience to vulnerabilities associated with hardware and embedded systems. Improving assurance and trust contributes to the reducing the frequencies and severities of adverse events with attention to system missions, performance, schedule, and cost.The NSF CHEST Center website, www.nsfchest.org, is the repository for all publicly accessible data, code, results, etc. These pages will be maintained for at least as long as the CHEST Center is active. In addition, all projects led by the University of Cincinnati (UC) will be permanently archived in digital format on the UC file servers with sufficient provisions for backup and recovery in case of equipment failure. All archival UC computers and servers are backed up on a regular basis.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

硬件和嵌入式系统安全与信任中心(ROST)协调基于大学的研究与行业和政府合作伙伴的需求，以促进电子硬件和嵌入式系统的安全、保证和信任方面的知识。ROST的兴趣包括识别、检测、监控、缓解和消除影响硬件和嵌入式系统的漏洞。该中心针对设计、运营、制造、供应链以及将硬件、软件和固件集成到各种系统中的一系列攻击媒介。该中心正在向利益相关者发明和传播技术、实践和指导方针，并培养下一代专家。NSF胸科中心致力于解决以下几个层面的安全、保证和信任问题：大规模系统、嵌入式系统、设计和运营、要求、标准、制造、供应链以及集成电路和电路板。在这些大学中，辛辛那提大学将在电路层面领导硬件和嵌入式系统安全和信任的公益性努力。主题包括设计、检测、避免、减轻和防止恶意攻击的方法：(I)侧通道攻击避免和缓解；(Ii)拆分制造和用于硬件完整性监控的附加组件；以及(Iii)用于增强加密/混淆、伪装、拆分制造、特洛伊木马检测、反向工程和水印应用的硬件加速。集成网络物理系统的安全、保证和信任能够满足人类的基本需求，并支持国家更广泛的社会、环境和经济进步。系统吸收破坏性冲击并以最小损失恢复的能力是保护人类生命和财产的关键。NSF胸部中心影响着行业、政府和军方在设计、保护和应对与硬件和嵌入式系统相关的漏洞方面的实践。改善保证和信任有助于降低不良事件的频率和严重性，并关注系统任务、性能、进度和成本。NSF胸部中心网站www.nsfchest.org是所有可公开访问的数据、代码、结果等的存储库。只要胸部中心处于活动状态，这些页面将至少保持不变。此外，辛辛那提大学(UC)牵头的所有项目都将以数字格式永久存档在UC文件服务器上，并为设备故障时的备份和恢复提供足够的资金。所有存档的UC计算机和服务器都定期进行备份。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Fully BEOL-Compatible Switch Boxes Using RRAMs and Thin Film Transistors for Reconfigurable and Secure ICs

完全兼容 BEOL 的开关盒，使用 RRAM 和薄膜晶体管实现可重新配置和安全 IC

• DOI: 10.1109/mwscas47672.2021.9531906
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: 2021 IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS
• 作者: Ruen, Aaron;Barua, Abhijeet;Jha, Rashmi;Emmert, John M.
• 通讯作者: Emmert, John M.

Critical Datapath Cells for NCL Asynchronous Circuit Area Reduction

用于减少 NCL 异步电路面积的关键数据路径单元

• DOI: 10.1109/naecon49338.2021.9696312
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: NAECON 2021 - IEEE National Aerospace and Electronics Conference
• 作者: Phillips, Dallas A.;Emmert, John M.
• 通讯作者: Emmert, John M.

Area Efficient Asynchronous Circuits for Side Channel Attack Mitigation

用于缓解侧信道攻击的面积高效异步电路

• DOI: 10.1109/iccd56317.2022.00089
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: 2022 IEEE 40th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD
• 作者: Phillips, Dallas A.;Chen, Pingxiuqi;Emmert, John M.
• 通讯作者: Emmert, John M.

An Asynchronous FPGA THx2 Programmable Cell for Mitigating Side-Channel Attacks

用于缓解侧通道攻击的异步 FPGA THx2 可编程单元

• DOI: 10.1109/mwscas48704.2020.9184563
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: 2020 IEEE 63rd International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS
• 作者: Emmert, John M.;Perumalla, Anvesh;Concha, Luis
• 通讯作者: Concha, Luis

TripletPower: Deep-Learning Side-Channel Attacks over Few Traces

• DOI: 10.1109/host55118.2023.10133495
• 发表时间: 2023-05
• 期刊: 2023 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
• 作者: Chenggang Wang;Jimmy Dani;S. Reilly;Austen Brownfield;Boyang Wang;J. Emmert