Monotone Methods in Reputations: Behavioral Predictions and Reputation Sustainability

声誉中的单调方法：行为预测和声誉可持续性

• 批准号: 1947021
• 负责人: Di Pei
• 金额: $ 27.7万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-09-01 至 2024-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1947021&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Monotone; Methods; Reputations; Behavioral; Predictions

This award funds research in economic theory. The PI wants to advance the use of game theory to understand how strategic decision makers build and maintain reputations. The research focuses on understanding how a long lived individual, firm, or organization will make decisions when it faces a series of short lived opponents who have less information about relevant facts. The project will focus on developing specific predictions that can be tested with data. The research seeks to answer specific questions. First, when can decision makers sustain reputations? Second, how will decision makers behave when reputation building is costly and monitoring is noisy? Third, how can we best test the predictions of reputation models given limited availability of data on long-term interactions? The principal investigator will answer these questions by using monotone methods. The first project introduces interdependent values to the study of reputations. This expands the applicability of reputation results to a richer set of informational environments. The project will give robust predictions on player’s behaviors in addition to their payoffs. The second project will examine whether and how interdependent values can contribute to the sustainability of reputations. The goal is to relate long run outcomes (such as reputation sustainability) to primitives, including the supermodularity or submodularity of stage-game payoffs, and players’ beliefs about the payoff relevant state. The third project develops an alternative framework to study reputations. This framework may help us better understand players’ reputation building behaviors. It also can yield sharp predictions on a long-run player’s action frequencies that apply not only to all of his equilibrium strategies, but also to all equilibrium best replies. This means that the prediction can be tested by observing a realized path of equilibrium play.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项资助经济理论研究。PI希望推进博弈论的使用，以了解战略决策者如何建立和维护声誉。该研究的重点是了解一个长寿的个人，公司或组织将如何在面对一系列短命的对手时做出决策，这些对手对相关事实的信息较少。该项目将侧重于开发可以用数据进行测试的具体预测。这项研究旨在回答具体问题。首先，决策者什么时候才能维持声誉？第二，当声誉建设成本高昂，监控嘈杂时，决策者将如何行事？第三，在长期互动数据有限的情况下，我们如何才能最好地测试声誉模型的预测？主要研究者将使用单调方法回答这些问题。第一个项目介绍了相互依存的价值观的声誉的研究。这将信誉结果的适用性扩展到更丰富的信息环境。该项目将提供强大的预测球员的行为，除了他们的收益。第二个项目将研究相互依存的价值观是否以及如何有助于声誉的可持续性。我们的目标是将长期的结果（如声誉的可持续性）与原语，包括超模块性或子模块性的阶段游戏的回报，和球员的信念有关的回报相关的状态。第三个项目开发了一个研究声誉的替代框架。这个框架可以帮助我们更好地理解玩家的声誉建立行为。 它还可以对长期玩家的行动频率进行精确预测，不仅适用于他所有的均衡策略，而且适用于所有的均衡最佳对策。这意味着预测可以通过观察一个实现的平衡发挥的路径进行测试。这个奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已被认为是值得通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估的支持。

项目成果

Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games

重复博弈中的均衡行为

• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Journal of economic theory
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: Harry PEI, Yingkai Li

Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem

玩混合动作的声誉：表征定理

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Journal of economic theory
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: Harry PEI

Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment

信任与背叛：声誉回报和没有承诺的行为

• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Theoretical economics
• 影响因子: 1.7
• 作者: Harry PEI

Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values

相互依存价值观下的声誉效应

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Econometrica
• 影响因子: 6.1
• 作者: Harry PEI

A Reputation for Honesty

诚实的声誉

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Journal of economic theory
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: Harry PEI, Drew Fudenberg