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Monotone Methods in Reputations: Behavioral Predictions and Reputation Sustainability

Monotone Methods in Reputations: Behavioral Predictions and Reputation Sustainability
声誉中的单调方法:行为预测和声誉可持续性
批准号:
1947021
负责人:
Di Pei
金额:
$27.7万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2020
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2020-09-01 至 2024-08-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
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英文摘要
This award funds research in economic theory. The PI wants to advance the use of game theory to understand how strategic decision makers build and maintain reputations. The research focuses on understanding how a long lived individual, firm, or organization will make decisions when it faces a series of short lived opponents who have less information about relevant facts. The project will focus on developing specific predictions that can be tested with data. The research seeks to answer specific questions. First, when can decision makers sustain reputations? Second, how will decision makers behave when reputation building is costly and monitoring is noisy? Third, how can we best test the predictions of reputation models given limited availability of data on long-term interactions? The principal investigator will answer these questions by using monotone methods. The first project introduces interdependent values to the study of reputations. This expands the applicability of reputation results to a richer set of informational environments. The project will give robust predictions on player’s behaviors in addition to their payoffs. The second project will examine whether and how interdependent values can contribute to the sustainability of reputations. The goal is to relate long run outcomes (such as reputation sustainability) to primitives, including the supermodularity or submodularity of stage-game payoffs, and players’ beliefs about the payoff relevant state. The third project develops an alternative framework to study reputations. This framework may help us better understand players’ reputation building behaviors. It also can yield sharp predictions on a long-run player’s action frequencies that apply not only to all of his equilibrium strategies, but also to all equilibrium best replies. This means that the prediction can be tested by observing a realized path of equilibrium play.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
期刊论文(7)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games
重复博弈中的均衡行为
DOI: --
发表时间: 2021
期刊: Journal of economic theory
影响因子: 1.6
作者: [Harry PEI, Yingkai Li]
通讯作者: Harry PEI, Yingkai Li
DOI: --
发表时间: 2022
期刊: Journal of economic theory
影响因子: 1.6
作者: [Harry PEI]
通讯作者: Harry PEI
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
信任与背叛:声誉回报和没有承诺的行为
DOI: --
发表时间: 2021
期刊: Theoretical economics
影响因子: 1.7
作者: [Harry PEI]
通讯作者: Harry PEI
Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values
相互依存价值观下的声誉效应
DOI: --
发表时间: 2020
期刊: Econometrica
影响因子: 6.1
作者: [Harry PEI]
通讯作者: Harry PEI
6
    Career: Reputation with Limited Information, Theory and Applications
    • 批准号:
      2337566
    • 项目类别:
      Continuing Grant
    • 资助金额:
      $46.24万
    • 财政年份:
      2024
    • 负责人:
      Di Pei
    • 依托单位:
    国内基金
    海外基金
    Computational Methods for Analyzing Toponome Data