SaTC: CORE: Medium: Collaborative: Studying the Impact of IPv6 on Information Controls and Censorship Circumvention

SaTC：核心：媒介：协作：研究 IPv6 对信息控制和审查规避的影响

• 批准号: 1953786
• 负责人: Amir Houmansadr
• 金额: $ 40万
• 依托单位: University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-10-01 至 2024-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1953786&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Medium; Collaborative; Studying

Deployment of the IPv6 standard has seen a rapid increase in the past decade with Google currently measuring 25-30% of their traffic being served over native IPv6 connections, 25% of all Internet-connected networks advertising IPv6 connectivity, and major mobile networks such as T-Mobile embracing the standard. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for censorship circumvention tool developers and researchers to measure how IPv6 deployments are impacting online information control systems, and how the emergence of IPv6 could enable novel circumvention techniques to augment existing tools. The overall objective in this project is to develop measurement methodologies to track IPv6-specific information control deployments and develop new circumvention strategies which leverage features of the IPv6 deployment and protocol. The research can have wide reaching near and long term impact in terms of facilitating free and open communication over the Internet. The project makes the following technical contributions. First, the project measures how information controls deployments are modified to handle IPv6 traffic. The project seeks to understand how IPv6 is handled by information controls deployments. To this end, the investigators explore two directions: updating existing IPv4-specific measurement techniques and platforms to make them IPv6-capable and developing new measurement techniques utilizing the IPv6 protocol to improve information controls measurement capabilities. Second, the project designs schemes that leverage the IPv6 protocol to bypass online censors in the short- and long-term. The goal is to understand how the IPv6 protocol can aid censorship circumvention. To this end, the researchers explore three directions: (1) making short-term gains against censors by leveraging IPv6 transition technologies, (2) advancing the state of Refraction Networking technologies by using IPv6, and (3) developing clean slate IPv6 based circumvention tools.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

IPv6标准的部署在过去十年中迅速增长，Google目前测量其25-30%的流量通过原生IPv6连接提供服务，所有互联网连接网络中有25%广告IPv6连接，以及主要的移动的网络，如T-移动的采用该标准。因此，迫切需要审查规避工具开发人员和研究人员来衡量IPv6部署如何影响在线信息控制系统，以及IPv6的出现如何使新的规避技术能够增强现有工具。本项目的总体目标是开发测量方法，以跟踪IPv6特定的信息控制部署，并开发新的规避策略，利用IPv6部署和协议的功能。这项研究可以在促进互联网上的自由和开放的通信方面产生广泛的近期和长期影响。该项目做出了以下技术贡献。首先，该项目测量如何修改信息控制部署以处理IPv6流量。该项目旨在了解信息控制部署如何处理IPv6。为此，研究人员探索两个方向：更新现有的IPv4特定的测量技术和平台，使其IPv6的能力和开发新的测量技术，利用IPv6协议，以提高信息控制测量能力。其次，该项目设计了利用IPv6协议绕过短期和长期在线审查的方案。我们的目标是了解IPv6协议如何帮助规避审查。为此，研究人员探索了三个方向：（1）通过利用IPv6过渡技术来对抗审查者，取得短期收益，（2）通过使用IPv6来推进折射网络技术的状态，以及（3）该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并被认为值得通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的评估来支持。影响审查标准。

项目成果

Where Have All the Paragraphs Gone? Detecting and Exposing Censorship in Chinese Translation

所有段落都去哪儿了？

• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Free and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI
• 作者: Streisand, Mizhang;Wustrow, Eric;Houmansadr, Amir
• 通讯作者: Houmansadr, Amir

Machine Learning with Differentially Private Labels: Mechanisms and Frameworks

• DOI: 10.56553/popets-2022-0112
• 发表时间: 2022-10
• 期刊: Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.
• 作者: Xinyu Tang;Milad Nasr;Saeed Mahloujifar;Virat Shejwalkar;Liwei Song;Amir Houmansadr;Prateek

Investigating Traffic Analysis Attacks on Apple iCloud Private Relay

调查针对 Apple iCloud 专用中继的流量分析攻击

• DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3595793
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
• 作者: Zohaib, Ali;Sheffey, Jade;Houmansadr, Amir
• 通讯作者: Houmansadr, Amir

How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic

中国防火墙如何检测和阻止完全加密的流量

• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: USENIX Security Symposium
• 作者: Wu, Mingshi;Sippe, Jackson;Sivakumar, Danesh;Burg, Jack;Anderson, Peter;Wang, Xiaokang;Bock, Kevin;Houmansadr, Amir;Levin, Dave;Wustrow, Eric
• 通讯作者: Wustrow, Eric

Mitigating Membership Inference Attacks by Self-Distillation Through a Novel Ensemble Architecture

通过新颖的集成架构通过自蒸馏缓解成员推理攻击

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: USENIX Security Symposium
• 作者: Xinyu Tang;Saeed Mahloujifar;Liwei Song;Virat Shejwalkar;Milad Nasr;Amir Houmansadr;Prateek Mittal
• 通讯作者: Prateek Mittal