Pricing Services and Products in the Presence of Parallel Delivery Mechanisms and Strategic Consumer Behavior
Pricing Services and Products in the Presence of Parallel Delivery Mechanisms and Strategic Consumer Behavior
批准号:
2002155
负责人:
Krishnamurthy Iyer
金额:
$3.11万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2019
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2019-08-15 至 2020-05-31
中文摘要
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英文摘要
Delivery mechanisms are the processes by which firms sell their products and services to customers. For example, in online marketplaces, some sellers choose to sell their products at a fixed posted price, whereas others solicit bids and sell to the highest bidder. There have been many studies comparing the benefits of different delivery mechanisms to sellers and customers under the assumption that sellers offer their products through a single delivery mechanism. However, firms increasingly offer their products and services through multiple delivery mechanisms in parallel, allowing their customers to choose among the delivery mechanisms. The goal of this project is to develop models and algorithms to help sellers choose which delivery mechanisms to operate in parallel, what prices to charge in each delivery mechanism, and how to allocate limited service capacity among the different delivery mechanisms. The models and algorithms developed within the scope of this project will enable sellers to maximize their revenue, while providing more effective service to their customers.A key difficulty in the analysis of parallel delivery mechanisms is that the customers are strategic, and their decision to make use of a particular delivery mechanism depends on the decisions of the seller and of other customers. This dependence requires analyzing the equilibrium resulting from customers' and seller's decisions by using tools from game theory and stochastic models. Computation of equilibria is provably hard. This project will identify conditions under which equilibria exist and will characterize the structure of strategies employed by customers in equilibrium. This characterization will be used to identify the features of customers who make use of a particular delivery mechanism, make design decisions on prices and service capacities used in different delivery mechanisms, and to find the optimal amount of information sharing between the seller and the customers.
期刊论文(1)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion
针对拥挤的社会服务的信息设计:基于需求的最佳说服
DOI:
10.1145/3391403.3399504
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Anunrojwong, Jerry, Iyer, Krishnamurthy, Manshadi, Vahideh]
通讯作者:
Manshadi, Vahideh
Repeated Auctions in Incomplete Information Settings with Learning Bidders
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批准号:2002156
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$0.93万
-
财政年份:2019
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负责人:Krishnamurthy Iyer
-
依托单位:
Repeated Auctions in Incomplete Information Settings with Learning Bidders
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批准号:1633920
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项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$20.2万
-
财政年份:2017
-
负责人:Krishnamurthy Iyer
-
依托单位:
Pricing Services and Products in the Presence of Parallel Delivery Mechanisms and Strategic Consumer Behavior
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批准号:1462592
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$29.96万
-
财政年份:2015
-
负责人:Krishnamurthy Iyer
-
依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Web Services组合中的事务管理技术研究
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批准号:60603063
-
项目类别:青年科学基金项目
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资助金额:7.0万元
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批准年份:2006
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负责人:任怡
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依托单位:
应用于B2B电子商务的语义Web Services适应性分散式搜索技术研究
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批准号:70301009
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项目类别:青年科学基金项目
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资助金额:14.0万元
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批准年份:2003
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负责人:夏昊翔
-
依托单位:
Internet上支持高质量E-Services的零输入个性化技术的研究
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批准号:60173051
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项目类别:面上项目
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资助金额:18.0万元
-
批准年份:2001
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负责人:于戈
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依托单位: