Collaborative Research: International Coercion, Debt Relief, and Land Transactions

国家科学基金会摘要提案：2048406/2048416 PI姓名：Shea，帕特里克/Bunte，Jonas提案编号：2048406/2048416机构：休斯顿大学/德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校首席研究员：帕特里克Shea/Jonas Bunte NSF项目：安全和准备标题：协作研究：国际胁迫、债务减免、该项目将决定政府何时将其部分国家领土的控制权转移到国际债务偿还贷款债权人该项目将提供系统的证据，说明影响政府决定以土地换取债务减免的国内和国际条件。该项目的经验分析将以收集的与债务减免有关的国家间所有土地交易的新数据集为基础。这一项目的结果将有助于我们更好地了解各国的国际债务问题何时会导致它们向其他国家作出领土让步。 该项目将开发和测试关于政府可以选择采取的不同债务减免战略的理论，以及为什么有时选择土地交易而不是紧缩或违约等其他可用政策。将为2000年至2020年收集一个关于减免债务的土地交易的新的和更全面的数据集。将采用联立方程对新的数据集进行统计分析，以检验理论命题。该项目的成果将推动国际债务管理、国家利用经济杠杆在安全问题上获得国家让步以及关于领土让步的国际谈判动态等方面的基础研究。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

National Science FoundationAbstractProposal: 2048406/2048416 PI Name: Shea, Patrick/Bunte, JonasProposal ID: 2048406/2048416Institution: University of Houston/University of Texas at DallasPrincipal Investigator: Patrick Shea/Jonas BunteNSF Program: Security and PreparednessTitle: Collaborative Research: International Coercion, Debt Relief, and Land TransactionsThis project will determine when governments transfer control over portions of their national territory to pay off loan debts to international creditors. The project will provide systematic evidence on the domestic and international conditions that influence the decisions of governments to exchange land for debt relief. The empirical analyses in the project will be based on a new dataset to be collected on all land transactions between countries related to debt relief. The results of this project will contribute to improving our understanding of when the international debt problems of countries can lead them to make territorial concessions to other countries. The project will develop and test theory on the different debt relief strategies that governments can choose to adopt and why land transactions are sometimes selected instead of other available policies such as austerity or default. A new and more comprehensive dataset on land transactions for debt relief will be collected for the period 2000 to 2020. Statistical analyses of the new data set, employing simultaneous equations, will be conducted to test theoretical propositions. The results of the project will advance basic research on the management of international debt, the use of economic leverage by states to gain concession from states on security issues, and the dynamics of international negotiations over territorial concessions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.