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Conceptual change as a form of cognitive dynamics

概念变化作为认知动态的一种形式

基本信息

批准号：
246298980
负责人：
Privatdozent Dr. Jasper Liptow
金额：
--
依托单位：
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2014
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2013-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/246298980?language=en
关键词：
Conceptual change form cognitive dynamics

项目摘要

The aim of this project is to develop a philosophical account of conceptual change as a form of cognitive dynamics. It is a central task of philosophy to provide an understanding of ourselves as beings who are able to mentally and linguistically represent the world and acquire comprehensive and systematic knowledge about it. For finite and fallible beings like us, the acquisition of such a world view is a lengthy process of adapting our cognitive system to the information we receive from others and to the experiences we make: a process of cognitive change. The two basic forms of cognitive change are belief change and conceptual change. Belief change is a change of a belief system that results from adding beliefs to it or deleting beliefs from it. Conceptual change, by contrast, is a change in the conceptual system that is the source of the contents of our beliefs. The study breaks new ground: Philosophical studies of cognitive dynamics as a general phenomenon have so far been confined almost entirely to the problem of belief change and philosophical studies of conceptual change have been limited to the special case of scientific knowledge. Previous investigations of the problem of conceptual change as a general cognitive phenomenon have been carried through not in philosophy but primarily in developmental psychology and science education. In a first step, the basic characteristics of conceptual change are determined and it is shown how conceptual change differs from other forms of cognitive dynamics. One of the leading ideas is that two kinds of conceptual change have to be distinguished. The kind of conceptual change that previous studies have exclusively focused on is the replacement of concepts by other, similar, concepts. This kind of conceptual change is defined by the notion of incommensurability. The other kind of conceptual change is the qualitative change of particular concepts themselves. It is claimed that this second kind of conceptual change is also a basic form of cognitive dynamics. In a second step, an account of the "logic" of the process of conceptual change is given. It is shown how conceptual change of both kinds is possible and by which cognitive abilities it is enabled. Finally, the problems of conceptual progress and rational conceptual change are tackled by building on models of intentional conceptual change that have been developed in cognitive science. It is shown that conceptual change is a form of cognitive process that can be, to a certain degree, responsive to reasons and reflective control. The overarching goal is to reach a comprehensive understanding of cognitive dynamics by unifying the theory of rational belief change with a theory of rational conceptual change.

这个项目的目的是发展一个概念变化作为认知动力学的一种形式的哲学帐户。哲学的中心任务是把我们自己理解为能够在精神上和语言上代表世界的人，并获得关于世界的全面和系统的知识。对于像我们这样有限和容易犯错的人来说，获得这样一种世界观是一个漫长的过程，使我们的认知系统适应我们从他人那里获得的信息和我们的经验：一个认知变化的过程。认知变化的两种基本形式是信念变化和概念变化。信念改变是信念系统的改变，是增加信念或删除信念的结果;而概念改变则是概念系统的改变，概念系统是我们信念内容的来源。这项研究开辟了新的领域：认知动力学作为一种普遍现象的哲学研究迄今为止几乎完全局限于信念变化的问题，概念变化的哲学研究仅限于科学知识的特殊情况。概念变化作为一种普遍的认知现象，以往的研究主要是在发展心理学和科学教育中进行的，而不是在哲学中。在第一步中，概念变化的基本特征是确定的，它是如何显示概念变化不同于其他形式的认知动力学。其中一个主要观点是，必须区分两种概念变化。以前的研究专门关注的概念变化是用其他类似的概念取代概念。这种概念上的变化是由不可否认性的概念所定义的。另一种概念变化是特定概念本身的质变。有人声称，这第二种概念变化也是认知动力学的一种基本形式。在第二步中，帐户的“逻辑”的概念变化的过程中给出。它表明如何概念的变化，这两种是可能的，并通过哪些认知能力，它是启用。最后，通过建立在认知科学中已经发展起来的有意概念变化模型来解决概念进步和理性概念变化的问题。研究表明，概念变化是一种认知过程，在一定程度上，它对理性和反思控制具有反应性。总体目标是通过将理性信念变化理论与理性概念变化理论相统一来全面理解认知动力学。