D-ISN: Constraining Illicit Decision Making Within and Across Dynamic Supply Networks

这项非法供应网络扰乱行动(D-ISN)研究研究的目的是发展和评估非法决策的综合理论。这项研究考察了个人如何、何时以及为什么选择从事合法与非法活动，以实现利润最大化或在其行业内获得竞争优势。使用网络方法，该项目调查个人遵守或无视法律和法规的决定如何影响供应网络内其他行为者的决定。调查结果将确定可以通过法律、政策、法规和商业惯例实施的有针对性的干预措施，以限制从事非法活动的行为者获得的好处。该项目通过推动制定政策和做法的新方法，通过限制非法决策来支持国家繁荣，从而服务于国家利益，并将促进科学进步，鼓励利益攸关方开展新的对话，以找到扰乱供应网络内非法活动的方法。该项目采用多学科视角，使用犯罪学、商业和供应链以及运筹学领域的PI。该项目使用基于网络代理的模型(NABM)来模拟由相互竞争的合法、犯罪和非法易感行为者组成的网络社区在交易层面上的非法决策。该项目应用竞争理论，在效用最大化框架内利用犯罪者决策的理性选择观点来模拟支撑非法供应网络的竞争动态。这项研究将根据按摩治疗行业的特点开发初步模型，并将研究结果扩展到其他也涉及非法供应网络的行业，如农业、药品和假冒产品。该项目将揭示两个对了解和破坏非法供应网络至关重要的基本问题：(1)影响消费者和供应商的竞争动态，这些竞争动态推动了犯罪活动；(2)民事、刑事和营利性商业法规在不断变化的市场条件中发挥的作用。项目团队将与学术界、工业界和执法部门的合作者合作，开发一个可推广的、与领域无关的框架，以指导IS中断策略，以限制潜在违法者的成本收益计算。该项目将在多学科环境中培养能够解决复杂社会问题的研究生。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

The objective of this Disrupting Operations of Illicit Supply Networks (D-ISN) research study is to develop and evaluate an integrated theory of illicit decision making. This research examines how, when, and why individuals choose to engage in legitimate versus illicit activities to maximize profits or gain a competitive advantage within their industry. Using a network approach, the project investigates how individual decisions to comply with or disregard laws and regulations affect the decisions of other actors within a supply network. The findings will identify targeted interventions that can be enacted through laws, policies, regulations, and business practices to constrain the benefits gained by actors engaging in illicit activity. This project serves the national interest by advancing new ways to create policies and practices to support national prosperity by constraining illicit decision making and will promote the progress of science to encourage new dialogues among stakeholders to find ways to disrupt illicit activities within a supply network. The project takes a multidisciplinary perspective, with PIs from the fields of criminology, business and supply chains, and operations research.This project uses a networked agent-based model (NABM) to simulate illicit decision making at the transaction level among a networked community of competing legitimate, criminal, and illicit-susceptible actors. Applying theories of competition, the project utilizes the rational choice perspective of offender decision making within a utility maximization framework to model the competitive dynamics underpinning illicit supply networks. This research will develop initial models based on characteristics of the massage therapy industry, and the findings will be extended in applied to other industries that also involve illicit supply networks, such as agriculture, pharmaceutical drugs, and counterfeit items. This project will expose two fundamental issues essential for understanding and disrupting illicit supply networks: (1) the competitive dynamics affecting consumers and suppliers that drive criminal activities; and (2) the role that civil, criminal, and for-profit business regulations play in shifting market conditions. The project team will engage with collaborators from academia, industry, and law enforcement to develop a generalizable, domain-agnostic framework to direct ISN disruption strategies to constrain the cost-benefit calculation of potential offenders. The project will educate graduate students within a multi-disciplinary environment who will be capable of addressing complex societal issues.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.