D-ISN: Constraining Illicit Decision Making Within and Across Dynamic Supply Networks

本研究的目的是开发和评估非法决策的综合理论，扰乱非法供应网络（D-ISN）的业务。这项研究探讨了个人如何，何时以及为什么选择从事合法与非法活动，以最大限度地提高利润或获得行业内的竞争优势。该项目采用网络方法，调查遵守或无视法律法规的个人决定如何影响供应网络中其他行为者的决定。调查结果将确定有针对性的干预措施，可以通过法律，政策，法规和商业惯例来限制参与非法活动的行为者所获得的利益。该项目通过推动新的方法来制定政策和做法，通过限制非法决策来支持国家繁荣，从而为国家利益服务，并将促进科学进步，鼓励利益攸关方之间开展新的对话，以找到破坏供应网络内非法活动的方法。 该项目采取了多学科的角度来看，与PI从犯罪学，商业和供应链，以及运筹学领域。该项目使用了网络代理为基础的模型（NABM），以模拟非法决策在交易层面之间的竞争合法，犯罪和非法的敏感行为者的网络社区。应用竞争理论，该项目利用犯罪者决策的理性选择视角，在效用最大化框架内对支撑非法供应网络的竞争动态进行建模。这项研究将根据按摩治疗行业的特点开发初步模型，并将研究结果扩展到其他涉及非法供应网络的行业，如农业，药品和假冒产品。该项目将揭示理解和破坏非法供应网络所必需的两个基本问题：（1）影响消费者和驱动犯罪活动的供应商的竞争动态;以及（2）民事，刑事和营利性商业法规在改变市场条件中的作用。该项目团队将与来自学术界、工业界和执法部门的合作者合作，开发一个可推广的、与领域无关的框架，以指导ISN中断战略，限制潜在罪犯的成本效益计算。 该项目将在一个多学科的环境中教育研究生，他们将能够解决复杂的社会问题。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并被认为是值得通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估的支持。

The objective of this Disrupting Operations of Illicit Supply Networks (D-ISN) research study is to develop and evaluate an integrated theory of illicit decision making. This research examines how, when, and why individuals choose to engage in legitimate versus illicit activities to maximize profits or gain a competitive advantage within their industry. Using a network approach, the project investigates how individual decisions to comply with or disregard laws and regulations affect the decisions of other actors within a supply network. The findings will identify targeted interventions that can be enacted through laws, policies, regulations, and business practices to constrain the benefits gained by actors engaging in illicit activity. This project serves the national interest by advancing new ways to create policies and practices to support national prosperity by constraining illicit decision making and will promote the progress of science to encourage new dialogues among stakeholders to find ways to disrupt illicit activities within a supply network. The project takes a multidisciplinary perspective, with PIs from the fields of criminology, business and supply chains, and operations research.This project uses a networked agent-based model (NABM) to simulate illicit decision making at the transaction level among a networked community of competing legitimate, criminal, and illicit-susceptible actors. Applying theories of competition, the project utilizes the rational choice perspective of offender decision making within a utility maximization framework to model the competitive dynamics underpinning illicit supply networks. This research will develop initial models based on characteristics of the massage therapy industry, and the findings will be extended in applied to other industries that also involve illicit supply networks, such as agriculture, pharmaceutical drugs, and counterfeit items. This project will expose two fundamental issues essential for understanding and disrupting illicit supply networks: (1) the competitive dynamics affecting consumers and suppliers that drive criminal activities; and (2) the role that civil, criminal, and for-profit business regulations play in shifting market conditions. The project team will engage with collaborators from academia, industry, and law enforcement to develop a generalizable, domain-agnostic framework to direct ISN disruption strategies to constrain the cost-benefit calculation of potential offenders. The project will educate graduate students within a multi-disciplinary environment who will be capable of addressing complex societal issues.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.