权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility

信念代理和认知责任

基本信息

批准号：
269646665
负责人：
Professor Dr. Heinrich Wansing
金额：
--
依托单位：
Lehrstuhl Logik und Erkenntnistheorie
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/269646665?language=en
关键词：
Doxastic Agency Epistemic Responsibility

项目摘要

The project investigates some important concepts from epistemology, namely "doxastic agency" and "epistemic responsibility." Epistemic subjects, who hold beliefs and possess knowledge, are regarded not only as entertaining certain mental attitudes toward propositions, but as agents capable of making choices. This topic is today a central one in philosophy: on the one hand, contemporary theoretical philosophy has deeply investigated the connection between the practical dimension of responsibility and that of agency and knowledge; on the other hand, contemporary epistemology has developed a number of theories that deal with the these concepts. This project aims at integrating the basic concepts assumed in the epistemological debate with a formal apparatus that allows for a precise definition of such concepts and the rigorous checking of valid principles and verifiable statements. The project approaches epistemic responsibility of agents from the perspective of philosophical logic. In particular, the aim of the project is to provide clarification and new insights on three key issues: (i) the crucial distinction between a passive reception of updates and an active search for information; (ii) the connection between the idea that we could have formed our beliefs otherwise and the assessment of our conduct; (iii) the distribution of cognitive labor in cases of testimonial belief. While the methodology of the project is formal, the problems it deals with are key problems in theoretical philosophy, and they are connected with some of the most important topics in epistemology. The considered forms of doxastic agency contribute to our practice of belief formation and they give us an active role in this enterprise. Doxastic agency can prove reliable or unreliable, and in both cases (but more pressingly in the second one), the chance for an alternative belief formation proves essential in assessing the agent's epistemic performance. In particular, such a chance seems to be crucial in order to assess the epistemic responsibility of the agent. In this project, the notion of a reliable belief formation will be investigated and given formal expression. In bringing doxastic agency into the modal logic of agency and modal epistemic logic, the overall aim of this research is a new, conceptually sustained and detailed formal account of epistemic responsibility, which essentially refers to the appropriate exercise of doxastic control.

该项目研究了认识论中的一些重要概念，即“信念代理”和“认知责任”。持有信念并拥有知识的认知主体不仅被视为对命题抱有某种心理态度，而且被视为能够做出选择的主体。这个话题是当今哲学的一个中心话题：一方面，当代理论哲学深入研究了责任的实践维度与能动性和知识的实践维度之间的联系；另一方面，当代认识论已经发展了许多处理这些概念的理论。该项目旨在将认识论辩论中假设的基本概念与正式的工具相结合，以便对这些概念进行精确定义，并对有效原则和可验证的陈述进行严格检查。该项目从哲学逻辑的角度探讨主体的认知责任。特别是，该项目的目的是就三个关键问题提供澄清和新见解：(i) 被动接收更新和主动搜索信息之间的关键区别； (ii) 我们本可以以其他方式形成信念的想法与对我们行为的评估之间的联系； (iii) 在见证信念的情况下认知劳动的分布。虽然该项目的方法是正式的，但它所处理的问题是理论哲学中的关键问题，并且与认识论中一些最重要的主题相关。经过深思熟虑的信念代理形式有助于我们形成信念的实践，并让我们在这项事业中发挥积极的作用。信念代理可以证明是可靠的，也可以是不可靠的，在这两种情况下（但在第二种情况下更为紧迫），形成替代信念的机会对于评估代理的认知表现至关重要。特别是，这样的机会对于评估主体的认知责任似乎至关重要。在这个项目中，可靠信念形成的概念将被研究并得到正式表达。将信念能动性纳入能动性的模态逻辑和模态认知逻辑中，本研究的总体目标是对认知责任进行新的、概念上持续的、详细的正式说明，本质上是指信念控制的适当运用。