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Democratic Legitimacy in the EU: Inside the 'Black Box' of Informal Trilogies

欧盟的民主合法性：非正式三部曲的“黑匣子”内部

基本信息

批准号：
278408068
负责人：
Dr. Sofia Pagliarin, since 3/2020
金额：
--
依托单位：
Aberdeen Business School
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2016
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2015-12-31 至 2019-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/278408068?language=en
关键词：
Democratic Legitimacy EU Inside Black

项目摘要

Can the EU govern efficiently and with the people? Almost all EU legislation is now agreed in an early stage, facilitated by informal 'trilogue' negotiations in which a small number of representatives of three EU institutions bargain behind closed doors and present the agreement for approval in public meetings. We examine the complex dynamics of this 'black box' and assess the ability of EU institutions to bargain successfully, to foster or preclude political contestation, to create political coalitions across institutions, and avoid capture by special interests. We do this by combining, first, a comprehensive, large-scale analysis of patterns of trilogue negotiations, tracing systematically the evolution of Council and EP preferences in order to determine their respective bargaining success (package 1); second, in-depth process-tracing studies to explore what happens when issues with high political stakes enter the world of trilogues, i.e we examine the conditions under which informal trilogues affect bargaining success by looking at intra- and extra-institutional actors and their strategies to manage information flows (package 2) and explore how both mainstream and Eurosceptic and/or radical political groups mediate cross-institutional contestation (package 3). A fourth section (package 4) will bring these findings together to explain how patterns of contestation affect the evolution of preferences during the course of legislative negotiations.

欧盟能有效地与人民一起治理吗？几乎所有的欧盟立法现在都是在早期阶段达成一致的，这得益于非正式的“三方”谈判，即三个欧盟机构的少数代表闭门谈判，并在公开会议上提交协议供批准。我们研究这个“黑匣子”的复杂动态，并评估欧盟机构的能力，成功地讨价还价，促进或排除政治干预，建立跨机构的政治联盟，并避免捕获特殊利益。首先，我们对三方谈判模式进行了全面、大规模的分析，系统地追踪了理事会和欧洲议会偏好的演变，以确定各自的谈判成功率（包1）;第二，深入的过程跟踪研究，以探讨当具有高度政治风险的问题进入三部曲的世界时会发生什么，也就是说，我们通过观察机构内和机构外的参与者及其管理信息流的策略，研究了非正式三方对话影响谈判成功的条件（第二套），并探讨主流和欧洲怀疑论者和/或激进的政治团体如何调解跨机构的和解（第三套）。第四部分（第四套材料）将把这些研究结果结合起来，解释在立法谈判过程中，地位模式如何影响偏好的演变。