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Dictator's Endgame. Theory and empirical analysis of military behavior in authoritarian regime crises, 1946-2014

独裁者的终局。

基本信息

批准号：
279352037
负责人：
Professor Dr. Aurel Croissant
金额：
--
依托单位：
GIGA Institut für Asien-Studien
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/279352037?language=en
关键词：
Dictator Endgame.Theory empirical analysis

项目摘要

This project aims to analyze the role of the military during episodes of peaceful mass mobilization in non-democratic regimes. It aims to answer two questions: (1) When does the military defend the dictator against the mobilizing masses and when does it defect from the regime coalition? (2) How can different forms of defection be explained, i.e., when and why do military leaders side with the opposition, and when do they stage a coup d'etat, respectively? In order to answer these questions, we advance the concept of dictator's endgame, and develop a game-theoretic model that explains the outcome of authoritarian regime crises as the result of strategic bargaining between the dictator, the military leadership and the opposition over the distribution of material and political privileges. We test the model's explanatory power through a mixed methods approach that systematically combines statistical analyses and process tracing case studies. At the core of the empirical analysis rests an original quantitative dataset on all instances of mass mobilizations in non-democratic regimes worldwide between 1946 and 2014. Publication goals are three peer-reviewed articles in A-ranked international journals and an English-language monograph. All original data will be made publicly available after the end of the project period. As of now, there is no comparable study that combines deductive theoretical modeling and a multi-method empirical analysis of all instances of mass mobilization in autocratic regimes. The project, therefore, promises to deliver innovative theoretical and empirical contributions to four areas of political research: the study of non-democratic regimes, democratization research, research on civil-military relations, and the study of contentious politics.

该项目旨在分析军队在非民主政权的和平群众动员中的作用。它旨在回答两个问题：（1）军队什么时候保卫独裁者不受动员起来的群众的攻击，什么时候背叛政权联盟？(2)如何解释不同形式的叛逃，即，军方领导人分别在什么时候、为什么站在反对派一边，什么时候发动政变？为了回答这些问题，我们提出了独裁者的残局的概念，并开发了一个博弈论模型，解释了独裁政权危机的结果，独裁者，军事领导层和反对派之间的战略讨价还价的结果分配的物质和政治特权。我们测试模型的解释力，通过一个混合的方法，系统地结合统计分析和过程跟踪案例研究。实证分析的核心是1946年至2014年期间全球非民主政权所有大规模动员实例的原始定量数据集。出版目标是在A级国际期刊上发表三篇同行评审文章和一篇英文专著。所有原始数据将在项目期结束后公布。到目前为止，还没有一个类似的研究，结合演绎理论建模和多方法的实证分析的所有情况下，群众动员在专制政权。因此，该项目有望为政治研究的四个领域提供创新的理论和经验贡献：非民主政权的研究，民主化研究，军民关系研究和有争议的政治研究。