Grounding and persistence. Personal identity in bioethics

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Problems involving personal identity permeate the bioethical literature. They figure in discussions of advance directives, the definition of death, informed consent to certain brain interventions, etc. At first sight, it seems that these issues turn on persistence, our numerical identity through time. Many contemporary bioethicists, however, think otherwise. According to them the relation that should ground our identity-related judgments is not numerical but narrative identity. Instead of ruminating about intricate metaphysical issues we should therefore better inquire into the stories people tell (or would tell) of their lives. In my research project I will scrutinize this position and the narrativistic theory of personal identity on which it relies. I will explain why I am critical of it and some of its presuppositions and argue for an alternative grounding relation. Special attention will be paid to the relevance of personal identity for ethics and the thesis that our numerical identity through time is not what matters. I want to challenge various arguments sustaining this popular stance and refurbish the role of our numerical identity and personal ontology for ethics. Since I hypothesize that numerical identity might not be the whole story when it comes to grounding our identity-related concerns, a further step in the project will be to look for a nonnarative relation that may serve to complement numerical identity. Finally I want to apply this alternative conception to selected bioethical problems.