Re-evaluating Minority Shareholding in Competition Law Against the Background of Horizontal Shareholding by Investors: Lessons Drawn From Fintech and E-Commerce Startups in Asia

投资者横向持股背景下重新评估竞争法中的少数股权：亚洲金融科技和电子商务初创企业的经验教训

• 批准号: 21H00666
• 负责人: VAN・UYTSEL S
• 金额: $ 7.57万
• 依托单位: Kyushu University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2021-04-01 至 2026-03-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-21H00666/
• 关键词: horizontal shareholding; cartel facilitator; new theory of harm; venture capital; hub and spoke; common ownership; keiretsu; Ola; Softbank; Snapdeal; Flipkart; quiet life theory; competition law; Asia; institutional investor; startups; uni

The research achievements are twofold. First, the empirical research has shown that venture capitalists have intervened often in the investees' corporate strategies. This has been most obvious in the case of Ola and Uber. Being investor in both firms, Softbank has been urging Ola to merge with Uber. Softbank also tried to engineer a merger between Flipkart and Snapdeal. There is also information that it was Softbank pushing for the merger between Uber and Grab in South-East Asia. These engineered mergers beg the question whether the concept of killer acquisitions should not be reconsidered towards acquisitions to kill competition by a horizontal shareholder or common owner. Second, the theoretical research has focused on the theory of "quiet life" to explain the reason why horizontal shareholding or common ownership could raise prices or limit product choice. The interesting part of this theory is that it has also been used to explain weaknesses within the keiretsu structure, despite the keiretsu being about cross-ownership. The paradox is that to tackle the quiet life, corporate law reforms have been introduced and these in turn led to the creation of common ownership. This triggers the question on the appropriateness of corporate law to tackle negative outcomes of common ownership.

研究成就是双重的。首先，实证研究表明，风险资本家经常干预投资者的公司战略。对于Ola和Uber来说，这是最明显的。作为这两家公司的投资者，软银一直在敦促Ola与Uber合并。软银还试图在Flipkart和Snapdeal之间进行合并。还有信息说，这是软银在东南亚的Uber和Grab之间的合并。这些工程的合并提出了一个问题，即是否不应重新考虑杀手获取的概念，以杀死水平股东或普通所有者杀死竞争。其次，理论研究集中在“安静生活”的理论上，以解释横向股权或共同所有权可以提高价格或限制产品选择的原因。该理论的有趣部分是，尽管Keiretsu是关于跨所有权，但它也已被用来解释Keiretsu结构中的弱点。悖论是要解决安静的生活，已经引入了公司法改革，而这些改革又导致了共同所有权的创造。这引发了有关公司法适当性的问题，以解决共同所有权的负面结果。

项目成果

Competition Law in A Digital Environment

数字环境中的竞争法

• 发表时间: 2021
• 作者: Taro Yamauchi;Seiji Nakao;Hidenori Harada;松尾陽;荻野奈緒;大杉謙一;田村和彦;佐藤 岩夫;Steven Van Uytsel
• 通讯作者: Steven Van Uytsel

Catholic University of Leuven(ベルギー)

鲁汶天主教大学（比利时）

Kyushu University Workshop on Horizontal Shareholding

九州大学横向持股研讨会

• 发表时间: 2021

Lund University(スウェーデン)

隆德大学（瑞典）

Japan's Corporate Governance Paradox: Common Ownership

日本公司治理悖论：共同所有制

• 发表时间: 2022
• 作者: Yasunori Kasai;Steven Van Uytsel
• 通讯作者: Steven Van Uytsel