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Development of Tamper-resistant Post-Quantum Cryptographic Hardware

防篡改后量子密码硬件的开发

基本信息

批准号：
19K24336
负责人：
YLIMAEYRY VILLE
金额：
$ 1.83万
依托单位：
Tohoku University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
财政年份：
2019
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2019-08-30 至 2021-03-31
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

During this fiscal year, we carried out research into the SABER post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) key exchange algorithm in the the following 2 areas.1. Hardware implementationWe implemented hashing functions SHA-256 and SHAKE-128 in multiple models, including the resource effective fully pipelined implementation, and the partially unrolled, low latency implementation. We designed the scheduling of simultaneous execution of computation modules which allows the hardware implementation of the key exchange to parallelize several steps of the algorithm.2. Side-channel security evaluationWe considered (A) traditional side-channel attacks on multiplication modules of PQC algorithms using electro-magnetic radiation emanating from the attacked device (B) a new side-channel attack we proposed which can exploit path activation biases in unrolled block ciphers and hashing functions, such as SHA-256 used in SABER (C) fault injection attacks on PQC, which intentionally produce erroneous computation in the attacked device processing the PQC key exchange. We believe the research of (A) is widely examined in other works, so we did not pursue it in detail. However, using (B), we demonstrated a new type of side-channel leakage that might be exploited to reveal secret inputs of the hashing algorithms. Further, using (C), we found that an attacker may reveal secret information about the key exchange by injecting faults into the clock signal used in the device to skip some computation.

本财年，我们在以下两个方面对SABRE后量子密码（PQC）密钥交换算法进行了研究： 1．硬件实现我们在多个模型中实现了哈希函数 SHA-256 和 SHAKE-128，包括资源有效的完全流水线实现，以及部分展开的低延迟实现。我们设计了计算模块同时执行的调度，允许密钥交换的硬件实现并行化算法的几个步骤。 2．侧信道安全评估我们考虑了 (A) 使用受攻击设备发出的电磁辐射对 PQC 算法乘法模块进行传统侧信道攻击 (B) 我们提出的一种新的侧信道攻击，可以利用展开分组密码和散列函数中的路径激活偏差，例如 SABER 中使用的 SHA-256 (C) 故障注入攻击 PQC，故意在处理 PQC 密钥交换的受攻击设备中产生错误计算。我们相信（A）的研究在其他作品中得到了广泛的研究，因此我们没有对其进行详细研究。然而，使用（B），我们演示了一种新型的侧通道泄漏，可以利用它来揭示哈希算法的秘密输入。此外，使用（C），我们发现攻击者可能通过向设备中使用的时钟信号注入故障来跳过某些计算来泄露有关密钥交换的秘密信息。