Development of Tamper-resistant Post-Quantum Cryptographic Hardware

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During this fiscal year, we carried out research into the SABER post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) key exchange algorithm in the the following 2 areas.1. Hardware implementationWe implemented hashing functions SHA-256 and SHAKE-128 in multiple models, including the resource effective fully pipelined implementation, and the partially unrolled, low latency implementation. We designed the scheduling of simultaneous execution of computation modules which allows the hardware implementation of the key exchange to parallelize several steps of the algorithm.2. Side-channel security evaluationWe considered (A) traditional side-channel attacks on multiplication modules of PQC algorithms using electro-magnetic radiation emanating from the attacked device (B) a new side-channel attack we proposed which can exploit path activation biases in unrolled block ciphers and hashing functions, such as SHA-256 used in SABER (C) fault injection attacks on PQC, which intentionally produce erroneous computation in the attacked device processing the PQC key exchange. We believe the research of (A) is widely examined in other works, so we did not pursue it in detail. However, using (B), we demonstrated a new type of side-channel leakage that might be exploited to reveal secret inputs of the hashing algorithms. Further, using (C), we found that an attacker may reveal secret information about the key exchange by injecting faults into the clock signal used in the device to skip some computation.