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A2: Creative Abductive Inference and its Role for Inductive Metaphysics (IM)

A2: Creative Abductive Inference and its Role for Inductive Metaphysics (IM)
A2:创造性溯因推理及其在归纳形而上学 (IM) 中的作用
批准号:
327797547
负责人:
Professor Dr. Markus Schrenk
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
德国
项目类别:
Research Units
财政年份:
--
资助国家:
德国
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:

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中文摘要
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英文摘要
This project continues the work of project A2 in the first phase, exploring creative abduction (CA) as method of inductive metaphysics (IM) based on a selection of metaphysical questions and on the case studies in the B projects. The project consists of two parts. In the first part, A2.1, the reach of the abductive methodology in metaphysics is tested along the lines of the concepts of nomological necessity and possibility, that play a role in almost all domains of metaphysical explanations. A2.1 investigates whether and to what extent these notions or variants of them (e.g., lawlikeness versus fundamental lawhood, physical versus metaphysical necessity) can themselves be justified by abductive inferences meeting the rationality criteria for scientific abduction, unification and independent testability, in order to yield a notion of necessity that fits the practice of natural science. Particular attention is given to the role of independent evidence for nomological possibility based on assumptions about freedom. Finally, we will systematically investigate the different kinds of explanation employed in the abductive inferences in IM; this latter work package will be undertaken together with A2.2.In the second part, A2.2, it will be investigated how abductive methods that find fruitful application in the sciences but that have not yet been explored by our project in the first phase can be applied to metaphysics. In particular, the role model-building can play in metaphysics conceived as an abductive enterprise will be critically examined. Second, we will examine the extent to which using abductive virtues such as simplicity in metaphysical theorizing can help to improve metaphysical theories by making them more robust and less error-fragile. Third, in light of our foregoing inquiry and together with A2.1, we will answer the question of how abductively inferred metaphysical theories explain. In particular, we explore whether and how grounding explanations can be accounted for within IM.
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