B5: Statistical Causation, Intervention, and Freedom

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Project B5 investigates metaphysical questions concerning human action and freedom on the basis of the theory of causal Bayes nets (Spirtes et al. 2000). The answer to such questions depends on the specific theory of causation endorsed (cf. Hitchcock 2012). Using the theory of causal Bayes nets as one's background theory of causation seems promising from the viewpoint of Inductive Metaphysics: The theory's core can be backed up by an inference to the best explanation of certain empirical phenomena and several versions of the theory are empirically testable (Schurz & Gebharter 2016). Project B5 is specifically interested in the following four research questions (RQs). In RQ1 we ask how much freedom and what kinds of freedom are possible in light of a causal Bayes net framework. RQ2 is about how much freedom we have to assume to explain empirical phenomena such as successful cases of causal discovery by means of interventions, especially in experimentation and randomisation. Driven by an inference to the best explanation--one of the most important methods of Inductive Metaphysics--we develop a general and interdisciplinary theory of freedom. In RQ3 we investigate which empirical consequences are implied by different versions of the theory of causal Bayes nets when one adds different assumptions about free human interventions. Finally, in RQ4 we reconstruct prominent arguments from the literature on the freedom of human will and action within the theory of causal Bayes nets and evaluate their validity and the plausibility of their premises from the viewpoint of this particular theory of causation. In doing so, we focus especially on arguments for and against the compatibility of freedom and indeterminism.