Strategic Contracting with Complementary Assets under Assymetric Information
Strategic Contracting with Complementary Assets under Assymetric Information
批准号:
DP0667036
负责人:
Prof Andrew Wait
金额:
$7.97万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
澳大利亚
项目类别:
Discovery Projects
财政年份:
2006
资助国家:
澳大利亚
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2006-07-19 至 2010-12-10
中文摘要
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英文摘要
With the recent tendency for companies to patent any feasible innovations they might make, public policy must focus on the disincentive effects this may have for producers who must combine multiple patents. The project seeks to understand the 'holdout problem' that stems from such situations, and evaluate policy solutions for Australia and Internationally. Expected outcomes include publication in leading Australian and International journals, and inputs to the policy debate.
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