Strategic Contracting with Complementary Assets under Assymetric Information

信息不对称下资产互补的战略签约

• 批准号: DP0667036
• 负责人: Prof Andrew Wait
• 金额: $ 7.97万
• 依托单位: The University of Sydney
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Projects
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2006-07-19 至 2010-12-10
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DP0667036
• 关键词: Strategic; Contracting; Complementary; Assets; under

With the recent tendency for companies to patent any feasible innovations they might make, public policy must focus on the disincentive effects this may have for producers who must combine multiple patents. The project seeks to understand the 'holdout problem' that stems from such situations, and evaluate policy solutions for Australia and Internationally. Expected outcomes include publication in leading Australian and International journals, and inputs to the policy debate.

鉴于最近企业倾向于为他们可能做出的任何可行创新申请专利，公共政策必须关注这可能对必须结合多项专利的生产商产生的抑制作用。该项目旨在了解这种情况下产生的“抵抗问题”，并评估澳大利亚和国际上的政策解决方案。预期结果包括在澳大利亚和国际主要期刊上发表文章，以及对政策辩论的投入。