Self-Insight into Attitudes: Distinguishing Introspective from Social Self-Awareness in Research on Implicit Evaluations

近几十年来，有意识的意识在心理学的许多领域都是一个有争议的话题，一些研究人员声称我们的一些认知是有意识地无法接近的（Bargh，1999; Greenwald & Banaji，1995; Nosek，2007），其他人则对这一论断持怀疑态度（例如，Gawronski，Hofmann，& Wilbur，2006;纽韦尔& Shanks，2014）。在社会心理学中，这反映在关于内隐社会认知的讨论中，特别是内隐态度（Greenwald & Banaji，1995），但目前缺乏关于内隐社会认知中的现象学和意识决定因素的可测试预测的精确模型。目前的建议的目的是测试和验证一个模型，区分两种不同类型的自我意识是现象学上不同的，依赖于不同的认知过程，需要不同的分析方法，并可能澄清现有的混乱在该领域。内省自我意识关注的是一个人获取和报告自己认知的能力，而社会自我意识描述的是一个人是否对自己的认知与他人的认知有准确的感觉。在我之前关于态度的研究中（Hahn，Judd，Hirsh & Blair，2014），我们发现参与者在报告他们在内隐评估中反映的个人反应模式时是准确的（高内省意识）。然而，他们似乎对自己的反应与他人的反应相比有有限的洞察力（有限的社会自我意识），这种影响似乎导致了研究人员的误解，即内隐评价反映了无意识的态度。因此，这里提出的区别可以澄清以前的误解，具体描述他们的认知的哪些方面，人们可能会更多或更少地意识到。然而，他们还没有深入了解哪些因素和过程决定了不同类型的意识。目前的建议的目标是测试和验证一个新的模型，导致许多新的预测的决定因素的两种类型的自我意识的态度。我的目标是开发一个术语的因素参与有意识的意识，态度和内隐的评价，将允许更细致入微的讨论比目前可能的。这将澄清我们对人类意识这一方面的理解，并为关于刻板印象和偏见等重要社会问题的应用研究提供信息。

Conscious awareness has been a topic of contentious debates in many areas of psychology in recent decades, with some researchers claiming that some of our cognitions are consciously inaccessible (Bargh, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nosek, 2007), and others more skeptical about this assertion (e.g., Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2014). In social psychology, this is reflected in discussions around implicit social cognition and specifically implicit attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), but precise models with testable predictions about the phenomenology and the determinants of awareness in implicit social cognition are currently lacking. The purpose of the current proposal is to test and validate a model that distinguishes between two different types of self-awareness that are phenomenologically distinct, depend on different cognitive processes, require different methods of analysis, and may clarify existing confusions in the field. Whereas introspective self-awareness is concerned with a person's ability to access and report on his or her own cognitions, social self-awareness describes whether a person has an accurate sense of how his or her cognitions compare to the cognitions of others. In my previous work on attitudes (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014) we found that participants were accurate at reporting their individual patterns of the reactions reflected in implicit evaluations (high introspective awareness). However, they appeared to have limited insight into how their reactions compared to the reactions of others (limited social self-awareness), and this effect appears to have contributed to researchers' misperception that implicit evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. Hence, the distinction presented here may clarify previous misunderstandings by delineating specifically of which aspects of their cognitions people may be more or less aware. However, they do not yet shed insight onto what factors and processes determine the different types of awareness. The goal of the current proposal is to test and validate a new model that leads to many novel predictions about the determinants of each of the two types of self-awareness in attitudes. My objective is to develop a nomenclature of the factors involved in conscious awareness in attitudes and implicit evaluations that will allow for much more nuanced discussions than is currently possible. This will both clarify our understanding of this aspect of human consciousness, as well as inform applied research on important societal issues such as stereotyping and prejudice.