Spinoza and 'Expansive Naturalism'

自然主义被认为是当代英美哲学家的共同信念。它基于这样一种思想，即真实的可以被简化为一个基本结构，即，由（自然）科学研究的（物质）自然。这种减少被认为也适用于似乎是非物质的现象，例如良心或价值观。然而，现代思想中一种日益增长的趋势否认了这种还原论的可能性，指出还原论不能解释价值或意识等现象，而只是否认。然而，这种倾向的主张并不是说，我们应该在这种还原论的基础上放弃自然主义，而是应该发展一种“扩展的自然主义”，这种自然主义可以将良心和价值观等现象整合到自然作为物质的概念中。这一方面可以避免失去这些现象，另一方面也可以避免令人不满意的二元论或现实中的差距。为了发展这样一种“扩张的自然主义”，人们需要研究一种自然概念，这种概念可以包括自然科学的结果和方法以及像心灵或规范性这样的现象。 在我逗留期间，我将展示斯宾诺莎的典范哲学，特别是他的自然概念，因为它可以在他的《伦理学》中找到，可以为这个“扩张的自然主义”项目做出重要贡献。斯宾诺莎使用的术语“上帝”和“自然”作为同义词，因此声称，自然继承了古典系统的第一原则，为所有的现实。与此同时，斯宾诺莎也不是还原论思想家。像意识或规范性这样的现象不能被还原为物质原因，而是构成自然的一个独立部分，同时又与自然的物质方面密切相关。无论是部分，还是斯宾诺莎所说的“属性”，都是不同的，但只是同一个现实或性质的两个方面。通过这种区别中的统一的概念，就有可能根据物质和意识现象的特定规律来描述它们，而不会以笛卡尔的二元论或现代还原论告终。

Naturalism is held to be the common conviction of contemporary Anglo-American philosophers. It is based on the idea that what is real can be reduced to one fundamental structure, viz., (material) nature that is investigated by the (natural) sciences. This reduction is supposed to function also when applied to phenomena that seem to be non-material, like for instance conscience or values. However, a growing tendency in modern thought denies the possibility of this kind of reductionism pointing out that phenomena like values or consciousness are not explained by reductionism but simply denied. The claim of this tendency, however, is not that with this kind of reductionism we should drop naturalism at all but that we should develop an ‘Expansive Naturalism’ that can integrate phenomena like conscience and values in a conception of nature as matter. This would avoid losing these phenomena at the one hand, but would also avoid the unsatisfactory idea of dualisms or gaps within reality at the other. In order to develop such an ‘Expansive Naturalism’ one needs to work on a concept of nature that can include the results and methods of natural sciences as well as phenomena like mind or normativity. During my stay, I will show that and how the paradigmatic philosophy of Spinoza and especially his concept of nature as it can be found in his Ethica more geometrico demonstrata can contribute essential features to this project of an ‘Expansive Naturalism’. Spinoza uses the terms ‘God’ and ‘Nature’ as synonyms, claiming therefore that nature inherits the classical systematic place of the first principle for all reality. At the same time, Spinoza is no reductionist thinker. Phenomena like consciousness or normativity cannot be reduced to material causes but constitute an independent part of nature that at the same time is intimately related to the material side of nature. Either parts or, as Spinoza calls them, ‘attributes’ are distinct and yet just two sides of one and the same reality or nature. By this conception of unity within distinction it is possible to describe material and conscious phenomena according to their specific laws without ending up with a Cartesian dualism or with modern reductionism.