Spinoza and 'Expansive Naturalism'

自然主义被认为是当代英美哲学家的共同信念。它基于这样一种想法，即真实的东西可以被简化为一个基本的结构，即由(自然科学)研究的(材料)性质。当应用于似乎是非物质的现象时，例如良心或价值观，这种简化也应该起作用。然而，现代思想中的一种日益增长的趋势否认了这种还原论的可能性，指出价值或意识等现象不是用还原论来解释的，而是简单地否认。然而，这种倾向的主张并不是说，对于这种简约主义，我们应该完全放弃自然主义，而是我们应该发展一种可以将良心和价值观等现象整合到自然是物质的概念中的“扩张自然主义”。这将一方面避免失去这些现象，但另一方面也将避免现实中的二元论或差距的不令人满意的想法。为了发展这样一种“扩张性自然主义”，人们需要致力于一种自然观，它可以包括自然科学的结果和方法，以及像思维或规范性这样的现象。在我逗留期间，我将展示这一点，以及斯宾诺莎的典范哲学，特别是他的自然观，因为它可以在他的《更多几何演示》中找到，可以为这一‘扩张性自然主义’的项目贡献基本特征。斯宾诺莎使用术语“上帝”和“自然”作为同义词，因此声称自然继承了所有现实的第一原则的经典系统地位。同时，斯宾诺莎也不是简约主义思想家。像意识或规范性这样的现象不能简化为物质原因，而是构成自然的独立部分，同时又与自然的物质方面密切相关。要么是部分，要么是斯宾诺莎所说的“属性”，它们是截然不同的，但只是同一个现实或自然的两个方面。通过这种区别中的统一的概念，可以根据物质和意识现象的特定规律来描述它们，而不会以笛卡尔二元论或现代简化论而告终。

Naturalism is held to be the common conviction of contemporary Anglo-American philosophers. It is based on the idea that what is real can be reduced to one fundamental structure, viz., (material) nature that is investigated by the (natural) sciences. This reduction is supposed to function also when applied to phenomena that seem to be non-material, like for instance conscience or values. However, a growing tendency in modern thought denies the possibility of this kind of reductionism pointing out that phenomena like values or consciousness are not explained by reductionism but simply denied. The claim of this tendency, however, is not that with this kind of reductionism we should drop naturalism at all but that we should develop an ‘Expansive Naturalism’ that can integrate phenomena like conscience and values in a conception of nature as matter. This would avoid losing these phenomena at the one hand, but would also avoid the unsatisfactory idea of dualisms or gaps within reality at the other. In order to develop such an ‘Expansive Naturalism’ one needs to work on a concept of nature that can include the results and methods of natural sciences as well as phenomena like mind or normativity. During my stay, I will show that and how the paradigmatic philosophy of Spinoza and especially his concept of nature as it can be found in his Ethica more geometrico demonstrata can contribute essential features to this project of an ‘Expansive Naturalism’. Spinoza uses the terms ‘God’ and ‘Nature’ as synonyms, claiming therefore that nature inherits the classical systematic place of the first principle for all reality. At the same time, Spinoza is no reductionist thinker. Phenomena like consciousness or normativity cannot be reduced to material causes but constitute an independent part of nature that at the same time is intimately related to the material side of nature. Either parts or, as Spinoza calls them, ‘attributes’ are distinct and yet just two sides of one and the same reality or nature. By this conception of unity within distinction it is possible to describe material and conscious phenomena according to their specific laws without ending up with a Cartesian dualism or with modern reductionism.