On the limits of judgmental correction: Differences of fluency effects in bias awareness and naïve theories about bias direction.

论判断纠正的局限性：偏见意识和关于偏见方向的朴素理论的流畅性效果的差异。

• 批准号: 408780926
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Sascha Topolinski, since 12/2020
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Social Cognition Center Cologne
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2017-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/408780926?language=en
• 关键词: limits; judgmental; correction; Differences; fluency

In times of fake news and massive media manipulation, it is of highest societal relevance to explore how individuals can correct their judgments from unwanted influences. When people need to make a judgment about a stimulus in their environment, they are influenced not only by judgment-relevant characteristics of that stimulus and the content of their thoughts but also by the metacognitive feelings that accompany stimulus perception and thinking. One potent metacognitive feeling is the subjective experience of processing fluency, that is, the feeling of ease or difficulty with which information is processed. While fluency can be useful because it enables fast and effortless judgments, it is also often a source of bias with harmful results for judgment accuracy. This led to a vast amount of research on the processes that allow the correction of unwanted fluency biases, and classical research outlined two requirements of judgmental correction: a) awareness of the source of bias; and b) valid knowledge of the direction of the biasing effect. However, recent evidence on the correction of fluency effects shows that some fluency effects can be corrected for but others cannot, even if the above-mentioned requirements were seemingly fulfilled. The aim of this proposal is therefore to explore a new moderating variable of fluency correction success. I propose that different fluency effects vary in a) the degree of bias salience and thus in bias awareness; and b) the degree to which the relevant naïve theories individuals use for correction entail valid knowledge about the direction of the biasing effect. This will be tested in four clusters involving fluency effects that have generated mixed evidence regarding correction success in previous studies: word pronounceability and word length effects on trustworthiness judgments, which could not be corrected for in previous studies; and repetition and color contrast effects on truth judgments, which could be partially corrected or even overcorrected in previous studies. After replicating the correction performance for all these effects in Cluster A, Cluster B will test the bias salience and Cluster C will test participants’ lay theories about the direction of a possible influence of these fluency variations on their judgments. Finally, Cluster D will demonstrate that a successful correction of these fluency effects is only possible when both the bias is made salient and participants have a valid knowledge about the direction of influence.

在假新闻和大规模媒体操纵的时代，探索个人如何从不必要的影响中纠正自己的判断具有最高的社会意义。当人们需要对环境中的刺激做出判断时，他们不仅受到该刺激的判断相关特征和他们的思想内容的影响，而且还受到伴随刺激感知和思考的元认知感受的影响。一种强有力的元认知感觉是处理流畅性的主观体验，也就是说，处理信息的轻松或困难的感觉。虽然流畅性可以是有用的，因为它可以快速和毫不费力的判断，它也往往是偏见的来源，对判断的准确性有害的结果。这导致了大量关于纠正不必要的流利性偏差的过程的研究，经典研究概述了判断性纠正的两个要求：a）对偏差来源的认识;和B）对偏差效应方向的有效知识。然而，最近的证据表明，一些流畅性效应可以纠正，但其他人不能，即使上述要求似乎得到满足。因此，本研究的目的是探索一个新的调节变量的流畅性校正的成功。我认为，不同的流畅性效应在以下两个方面存在差异：（1）偏见的显著性程度，从而导致偏见意识的差异;（2）B）个体用于纠正的相关幼稚理论在多大程度上需要关于偏见效应方向的有效知识。这将在四个集群中进行测试，这些集群涉及流畅性效应，这些效应在以前的研究中产生了关于纠正成功的混合证据：单词发音能力和单词长度对可信度判断的影响，在以前的研究中无法纠正;重复和颜色对比对真理判断的影响，在以前的研究中可以部分纠正甚至过度纠正。在集群A中复制所有这些效应的校正性能之后，集群B将测试偏差显著性，集群C将测试参与者关于这些流畅性变化对其判断的可能影响方向的非专业理论。最后，聚类D将证明，只有当偏见变得突出并且参与者对影响的方向有有效的知识时，才有可能成功纠正这些流畅性效应。