To Observe and to Act. European Power Politics 1739-1741, as perceived by the Russian Vice-Chancellor Andrey Osterman.

大多数当代历史学家认为，近代早期的欧洲强权政治不仅仅是一个混乱的王朝和战争的纠缠。相反，他们更喜欢将单个事件放在一个更大的叙述中，描述备受争议的权力平衡系统的出现。他们接受这样一种观点，即所有大国的决策者从很久以前就忽视了整个大陆，对对手的能力和利益有着明确的想法，并且在没有预料到其他大国可能的反应的情况下从未做出过决定。安德烈·伊万诺维奇·奥斯特曼是1725年至1741年期间俄国外交事务的实际领导人，他必须被算作创造这一制度并使之发挥作用的人之一。研究的主题是“欧洲权力体系”（1740年前后）的理论和实践。对奥斯特曼观点的重构是一种认识论方法，可以称之为“历史政治学”。为了在一个坚实的经验基础上理解奥斯特曼的政治意识，本研究将从两个关键方面来重建他的观点和知识水平：A。1739年夏至1741年底奥斯特曼对国际强权政治的看法。欧洲以俄罗斯为中心的非正式网络的范围和表现。为了便于对所有相关资料进行深入的阅读和评估，时间上的影响将被限制在一个相当短的调查时期内。出于以下原因，将重点放在奥斯特曼事工的最后两年是有意义的。首先，他正处于职业生涯的巅峰，意识到自己有能力根据自己的喜好塑造欧洲电力系统和俄罗斯外交部。与此同时，国内外同时爆发了几场危机。这些都是研究一个直接运作的外交体系的理想先决条件--它是如何运作的，以及它是如何失败的。

Most contemporary historians view Early Modern European power politics as being more than just a chaotic thicket of dynastic and warlike entanglements. Instead, they prefer to place single episodes within a larger narrative that describes the emergence of the much-debated balance of power system. They accept the idea that decision-makers of all major powers overlooked the whole of the continent since long ago, disposed of clear-cut ideas about their rivals abilities and interests, and never made decisions without anticipating possible reactions of the other powers. Andrey Ivanovich Osterman, who was the factual leader of Russian foreign affairs between 1725 and 1741, must be counted among those who created this system and made it work. The topic of the study is the “European Power System” (around 1740) in theory and practice. Reconstruction of Osterman's point of view is the epistemological method, which could be called "historical political science". To understand Osterman's political consciousness on a solid empirical base, this study will reconstruct his views and level of knowledge by focusing on two key aspects: A. Osterman's perception of international power politics from summer 1739 to the end of 1741.B. Range and performance of Russian-centered informal networks in Europe. In order to facilitate an intense reading and evaluation of all relevant sources, the temporal ramifications will be limited to a rather short period of investigation.It makes sense to focus on the very last two years of Osterman's ministry for the following reasons. For one, he was at the height of his career, having become aware of his ability to shape both the European power system and the Russian foreign office according to his preferences. At the same time, several crises had simultaneously erupted abroad and at home. These are ideal preconditions to study a diplomatic system directly in action – how it worked and how it failed to do so.