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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROL POWER OF BANKS IN CORPORATE GROUPINGS IN JAPAN AND GERMANY --- AN ANALYSIS OF THE CO-DETERMINATION SYSTEM BASED ON PRINCIPAL-AGENT-THEORY

日德银行对企业集团控制权的比较分析——基于委托代理理论的共同决策制度分析

基本信息

批准号：
06451115
负责人：
KOYAMA Akihiro
金额：
$ 2.69万
依托单位：
GAKUSHUIN UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (B)
财政年份：
1994
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1994 至 1995
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

It is well known that the banking system in Germany is very unique and different from that in an. The system in Germany is very famous as the "universal banking system", which has various merits and demerits in the economic sense or in the sense of resource allocation. When banks try to influence or to monitor the firms in the corporate groupings (keiretsu in Japan and Konzern in Germany) , they must have some routes inside and outside the firms including three major routes. The first route is a very direct one. Banks send their officers or directors to the firms of their group and they work as the member of the board or as the officer of the group-firms. Then they can monitor whether the group-firms operate correctly and if necessary they can advise and correct the decision of the firms. The second route for the banks to influence the firms is to have the stock of them and the third is to give a long term credit to them. Anyway the banks, "main bank"in Japan and "Hausbank" in Germany, can control the group-firms through the above mentioned routes. It is, however, not clear whether the effect of the influence is beneficial for the group-firms or not. This is a typical problem which must be tested by empirical researches. Theoretically speaking, the agency cost between banks and group-firms can be reduced by the above mentioned three routes, if banks act fair, effectively and efficiently. We tried to test this relationship between banks and group firms based on the principal-agent theory. The lts are not always homogenous in Japan. The degree of bank's influence on the group-firms may be different among the periods of the empirical research and the role of the banks is said to have become weaker after the breakdown of the bubble-economies. It would be necessary to examine the results of empirical research further to have a general conclusion to judge the relationship.

众所周知，德国的银行体系非常独特，与美国的银行体系不同。德国的这一制度被称为“全能银行制度”，它在经济意义上或在资源配置意义上都有各种优点和缺点。当银行试图影响或监督企业集团中的公司（日本的keiretsu和德国的Konzern）时，它们必须有一些内部和外部的途径，包括三种主要途径。第一条路线是非常直接的。银行将其高级职员或董事派往集团公司，他们作为董事会成员或集团公司的高级职员工作。然后，他们可以监督集团公司是否运作正确，如果有必要，他们可以建议和纠正公司的决定。银行影响企业的第二种途径是持有它们的股票，第三种途径是向它们提供长期信贷。无论如何，日本的“主银行”和德国的“豪斯银行”都可以通过上述途径控制集团公司。然而，这种影响对集团公司是否有利尚不清楚。这是一个典型的问题，必须通过实证研究来检验。从理论上讲，在银行公平、有效、高效的条件下，通过上述三种途径可以降低银行与集团公司之间的代理成本。我们试图基于委托代理理论检验银行与集团公司之间的这种关系。在日本，这种情况并不总是千篇一律的。银行对集团公司的影响程度可能在实证研究的不同时期有所不同，据说银行的作用在泡沫经济破裂后变得更弱。有必要进一步检验实证研究的结果，以得出一个一般性的结论来判断这种关系。