A Comparative Analysis of the Control Power within Industrial Groupings in Japan and in Germany.

对日本和德国的产业集群进行比较研究，很难说是一个流行的主题。事实上，在恰当合理的组织经济理论，特别是新制度组织经济理论的基础上，很难对这一主题进行严格的研究。我们计划对日本和德国的工业集团进行经济分析，主要分析两国工业集团内部的控制力。起初，我们试图同时从理论和实证两方面对它们进行研究。但事实证明，这样的尝试是非常困难的，因此我们首先尝试在理论上以新的制度经济组织理论为基础进行分析，并尽量以“委托-代理理论”为主。通过分析发现，产业集团内部的控制权与集团及集团内企业的“公司治理”问题密切相关。更重要的是，如何在群体的利益相关者之间公平地分享结果。然后，我们分析了“治理成本”的影响，我们不仅讨论了通常断言的分组的缺点，而且还讨论了分组的优点。在接下来的部分中，我们对德国的康泽恩进行了经济分析。我们可以发现，对康泽恩公司及其子公司进行正确的监管存在额外的困难。作为仪器做到这一点，我们提到了两个关于监测的话题。最后，我们补充了两篇文章来支持我们的声明。前者是用德语写的，作为德国一本商业管理学术书籍的一部分在德国出版。本文认为，传统的日本管理理论已经过时，甚至是有害的。在委托-代理理论的基础上，从理论上明确了日本式管理模式的必要性。在第二篇用英文写的文章中，我们试图说明，所谓的主要银行的作用最好通过委托代理理论来分析和解释。本文是对本文主题进行实证分析的第一步，对于日本和德国的产业集团控制力的实证分析，我们将尝试在此基础上进一步完善，这是本研究未能完成的，对此我们感到遗憾。少

We can hardly say that a comparative research on industrial groupings in Japan and in Germany is a popular theme. In fact, it is very difficult to make a strict research on this theme based on the appropriate and reasonable economic theory of organization, especially the new institutional economic theory of organization. We planed to make an economic analysis of the industrial groupings in Japan and in Germany, mainly on the control power within the industrial groupings in both countries. At first, we tried to research them both theoretically and empirically at once. But it turned out that such attempt is very hard and thereafter we tried to analyze them firstly theoretically based on the new institutional economic theory of organization, mainly on "principal-agent theory" as much as possible. While analyzing them, it turned out that the control power within the industrial groupings is closely related to the problem of "corporate governance" of the groups and the firms in the groups. T … More he most important requirement there, is how to share the outcome fairly among the stakeholders of the group.Then we analyzed the effect of the "governance cost" and we argued not only on the disadvantage of groupings as very usually asserted but also on the advantage of them. In the following part, we made an economic analysis of the Konzern in Germany. We could find that there are additional difficulties to monitor the Konzern and its subsidiaries correctly. As the instrument to do it, we mentioned two topics concerning the monitoring.Finally, we supplement two articles to support our statement. The former is written in German and it was published in Germany as a part of a German academic book on business management. In this article, it is argued that the traditional theory of Japanese Management is out of date and even injurious. We made it theoretically clear that new form of Japanese Management Style is necessary, based on the principal-agent-theory.In the second article, which is written in English, we tried to make it clear, that the role of so-called main banks is best analyzed and interpreted through the principal-agent-theory. This article is the first step to make an empirical analysis of our theme and we will try further to complete our empirical analysis on the control power of the industrial groupings both in Japan and in Germany, which we could not finish in this research, to our regret. Less