A Comparative Analysis of the Control Power within Industrial Groupings in Japan and in Germany.

对日本和德国产业集群的比较研究很难说是一个热门的话题。事实上，基于恰当合理的组织经济理论，特别是新制度经济学的组织理论，对这一主题进行严格的研究是很困难的。我们计划对日本和德国的产业集团进行经济分析，主要分析两国产业集团内部的控制力。首先，我们试图从理论和实证两个方面进行研究。但事实证明，这样的尝试是非常困难的，此后我们尝试首先根据新制度经济学的组织理论进行理论分析，尽量以“委托代理理论”为主。通过分析发现，产业集团内部的控制权与集团及集团内企业的“公司治理”问题密切相关。不 ...更多信息 最重要的要求是如何在集团的利益相关者之间公平地分享结果，然后我们分析了“治理成本”的影响，我们不仅讨论了集团的缺点，而且还讨论了它们的优点。第二部分对德国康采恩进行了经济分析。我们可以发现，正确监控康采恩及其子公司还有其他困难。作为研究的工具，我们提出了两个关于监测的主题，最后补充了两篇文章来支持我们的观点。前者是用德语写的，它在德国出版，作为德国一本关于企业管理的学术著作的一部分。本文认为，日本传统的管理理论已经过时，甚至是有害的。我们从理论上明确了日本经营方式的新形式是必要的，基于委托代理理论。在第二篇英文文章中，我们试图明确，所谓的主银行的作用最好通过委托代理理论来分析和解释。本文是实证分析的第一步，对日本和德国的产业集团控制力的实证分析未能完成，我们将进一步尝试。少

We can hardly say that a comparative research on industrial groupings in Japan and in Germany is a popular theme. In fact, it is very difficult to make a strict research on this theme based on the appropriate and reasonable economic theory of organization, especially the new institutional economic theory of organization. We planed to make an economic analysis of the industrial groupings in Japan and in Germany, mainly on the control power within the industrial groupings in both countries. At first, we tried to research them both theoretically and empirically at once. But it turned out that such attempt is very hard and thereafter we tried to analyze them firstly theoretically based on the new institutional economic theory of organization, mainly on "principal-agent theory" as much as possible. While analyzing them, it turned out that the control power within the industrial groupings is closely related to the problem of "corporate governance" of the groups and the firms in the groups. T … More he most important requirement there, is how to share the outcome fairly among the stakeholders of the group.Then we analyzed the effect of the "governance cost" and we argued not only on the disadvantage of groupings as very usually asserted but also on the advantage of them. In the following part, we made an economic analysis of the Konzern in Germany. We could find that there are additional difficulties to monitor the Konzern and its subsidiaries correctly. As the instrument to do it, we mentioned two topics concerning the monitoring.Finally, we supplement two articles to support our statement. The former is written in German and it was published in Germany as a part of a German academic book on business management. In this article, it is argued that the traditional theory of Japanese Management is out of date and even injurious. We made it theoretically clear that new form of Japanese Management Style is necessary, based on the principal-agent-theory.In the second article, which is written in English, we tried to make it clear, that the role of so-called main banks is best analyzed and interpreted through the principal-agent-theory. This article is the first step to make an empirical analysis of our theme and we will try further to complete our empirical analysis on the control power of the industrial groupings both in Japan and in Germany, which we could not finish in this research, to our regret. Less