Disagreement about Monetary Policy

对货币政策的分歧

• 批准号: 437227220
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Peter Tillmann
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Monetäre Ökonomik (VWL V)
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2019-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/437227220?language=en
• 关键词: Disagreement; about; Monetary; Policy

Monetary policy is subject to debate. Market participants and forecasters disagree about future inflation and interest rates. However, there is also disagreement among policy-makers themselves about the future course of policy, which should affect the perception of policy by market participants. This project focuses on the latter type of disagreement among policy-makers in the euro area. Disagreement should be particularly important against the backdrop of unconventional monetary policy such as forward guidance, which relies on the ability of the central bank to provide information about future policy. If disagreement obfuscates the interpretation of signals from the central bank, policy might be less powerful.We study disagreement of policy-makers in the Governing Council of the European Central bank (ECB). In contrast to other central banks, the decision-making process at the ECB remains opaque. We overcome this problem by measuring disagreement based on text data, i.e. speeches delivered by policy-makers and transcripts of the regular press conferences. We plan to address disagreement in three steps: First, we use information from the press conference to construct a narrative index of dissent. We will assess whether the market reaction on meeting days is different depending on dissent or unanimity in the meeting. We will also evaluate whether dissent in the meeting affects the dispersion of views of the private sector. Second, we will extend our existing database to include all speeches of members of the ECB’s Governing Council. Based on a computational linguistic model, we slice the corpus of speeches into distinct topics, such that we can construct a topic-specific measure of disagreement. In a time-series model we evaluate the consequences of disagreement for policy transmission. Third, we study different preferences about inflation and real economic activity as one important source of disagreement among members of the council. In theoretical models of optimal monetary policy, preferences are expressed by a loss function, which the central bank minimizes based on a model of the economy. In contrast to the literature, we estimate loss functions directly, both for the council and for individual members, based on the tone of speeches rather than the solution of a full model of the economy. This also allows us to evaluate non-quadratic loss functions, where policy-makers put different weights on positive and negative deviations of inflation or unemployment from target. All three parts of the project will provide new insights into the relationship between monetary policy and financial markets and the transmission of monetary policy impulses.

货币政策是一个值得讨论的问题。市场参与者和预测者对未来的通胀和利率存在分歧。然而，决策者本身对未来的政策方向也存在分歧，这应该会影响市场参与者对政策的看法。本项目的重点是欧元区决策者之间的后一种分歧。在前瞻性指引等非常规货币政策的背景下，分歧应该特别重要，因为前瞻性指引依赖于央行提供未来政策信息的能力。如果分歧混淆了对中央银行信号的解释，政策可能会不那么有力。我们研究了欧洲中央银行（ECB）管理理事会决策者的分歧。与其他央行相比，欧洲央行的决策过程仍然不透明。我们通过基于文本数据（即政策制定者发表的演讲和定期新闻发布会的记录）来衡量分歧，从而克服了这个问题。我们计划分三步解决分歧：首先，我们使用新闻发布会上的信息来构建一个不同意见的叙述索引。我们将评估会议日的市场反应是否因会议中的异议或一致性而有所不同。我们也会评估会议中的不同意见是否会影响私营部门意见的分散。第二，我们将扩展现有数据库，以包括欧洲央行管理理事会成员的所有讲话。基于计算语言学模型，我们将语料库的演讲分为不同的主题，这样我们就可以构建一个特定主题的分歧措施。在一个时间序列模型中，我们评估了政策传导分歧的后果。第三，我们研究了对通货膨胀和真实的经济活动的不同偏好，这是理事会成员之间分歧的一个重要来源。在最优货币政策的理论模型中，偏好由损失函数表示，中央银行根据经济模型最小化。与文献相反，我们直接估计损失函数，无论是对理事会和个别成员，根据讲话的语气，而不是一个完整的经济模型的解决方案。这也使我们能够评估非二次损失函数，其中政策制定者对通胀或失业率与目标的正负偏差给予不同的权重。该项目的所有三个部分将为货币政策与金融市场之间的关系以及货币政策冲动的传导提供新的见解。