Engineering for Institutional Design : Building up a new field

制度设计工程:建立新领域

• 批准号: 16203012
• 负责人: SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
• 金额: $ 27.21万
• 依托单位: Osaka University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2004 至 2007
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012/
• 关键词: Engineering for Institutional Design; Secure Implementation; Nash; Pivotal Mechanism; Spiteful Behavior; Public Good; Nuerneconomics; Emergence of Cooneration; 拘泥; ブレイスパラドックス; スパイト行動; スパイト・アバージョン; セキュア・メカニズム; 支配戦略; ナッシュ均衡; グローブス・メカニズム; 前島

Engineering for Institutional Design is intended to develop a new field that aims at designing "real" and "robust" mechanisms or institutions using theory, experiment and survey. We propose a new concept called Secure Implementation as a fundamental framework for institutional design. Theorists usually presume behavioral principles at their own discretion. However, we cannot predetermine the principles of human behaviors. For this reason, we allow them to behave and choose from Nash to dominant strategies. One of the most famous mechanisms in the provision of public good is the Pivotal mechanism that is not securely implementable. We use human subjects to check out the performance between secure and non-secure mechanisms and find that the performance of secure mechanisms are significantly better than the Pivotal mechanism's one.Our "Are Japanese Spiteful?" project is to understand human behavior beyond the traditional selfish individual framework. When a public good is non-excludable, we prove that it is impossible to design a mechanism in which everyone has incentive to participate. We conduct experiments using Japanese, Chinese and American subjects and find that Japanese are spiteful in the following sense. Some Japanese subjects do not care about losing a little amount of payoff if it is possible that the other subjects lose quite a large amount of payoff. We name this as spiteful behavior. Furthermore, we find that human brain does not respond well to spiteful behavior, but respond quite well to altruistic behavior using fMRI. We also conjecture that spiteful behavior would be one of the fundamental human behaviors.We also conduct survey of environmental consciousness using Shanghai people. We find that elder people care about environment relative to younger people. This finding is rather different from the previous literature. Furthermore, we identify the strategies when a game is repeated finitely from both theoretical and experimental methods.

制度设计工程学旨在发展一个新的领域，旨在通过理论、实验和调查来设计“真实的”和“稳健的”机制或制度。我们提出了一个新的概念，称为安全执行作为制度设计的基本框架。理论家通常根据自己的判断来假定行为原则。然而，我们不能预先确定人类行为的原则。出于这个原因，我们允许他们的行为，并选择从纳什到优势策略。在提供公共产品方面，最著名的机制之一是不可安全实施的强制性机制。我们使用人类受试者来检验安全机制和非安全机制之间的性能，发现安全机制的性能明显优于非安全机制的性能。“项目旨在超越传统的自私个体框架来理解人类行为。当公共产品是非排他性的，我们证明了这是不可能的，设计一个机制，每个人都有激励参与。我们对日本人、中国人和美国人进行了实验，发现日本人在以下方面是恶意的。如果其他受试者可能会失去相当大的收益，一些日本受试者并不在乎失去一点点收益。我们称之为恶意行为。此外，我们发现，人类的大脑并没有恶意的行为反应良好，但反应相当好利他行为使用功能磁共振成像。我们还推测恶意行为可能是人类最基本的行为之一。我们发现老年人比年轻人更关心环境。这一发现与以往的文献有很大不同。此外，我们还从理论和实验两方面确定了重复博弈时的策略。

项目成果

理論→実験→ニューロ:日本人はいじわるがお好き?

理论→实验→神经：日本人喜欢乱搞吗？

• 发表时间: 2006
• 作者: Suzaki;Hiroshi;Kitamura;Masashi;Saito;Maki;Toda;Gyo;西條辰義
• 通讯作者: 西條辰義

Optimal Sales Scheme Against Interdependent Buyers

针对相互依赖买家的最优销售方案

• 发表时间: 2007
• 作者: 洲崎博史;北村雅史;齊藤真紀;戸田暁;村岡 啓一;加藤博;津谷 典子;Masaki Aoyagi
• 通讯作者: Masaki Aoyagi

"A Four Country Comparison of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms"

《四个国家自愿捐款机制的恶意、合作与失误比较》

• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: Public Choice 119(3-4)
• 作者: Jordi Brandts;Tatsuyoshi Saijo;Arthur Schram
• 通讯作者: Arthur Schram

"Elficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication"

“通过沟通进行重复拍卖的高效共谋”

• 发表时间: 2006
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Theory (掲載予定)
• 作者: Marlene Dyrloev Madsen;Henning Boje Andersen;Kenji Itoh;Masaki Aoyagi
• 通讯作者: Masaki Aoyagi

Secure Implementation

安全实施

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: Theorerical Economics Vol.2(3)
• 作者: Saijo;T.;T. Sjostrom;and T. Yamato
• 通讯作者: and T. Yamato