Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Auction Design Beyond Quasi-Linearity: Theory and Experiment

超越准线性的高效且与激励兼容的拍卖设计：理论与实验

• 批准号: 17H06828
• 负责人: ZHOU YU
• 金额: $ 1.75万
• 依托单位: Waseda University (2018)Osaka University (2017)
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2017-08-25 至 2019-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828/
• 关键词: Auction; Non-quasi-linearity; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Incentive compatibility; Multi-object auction; General preferences; Price adjustment process; Characterizations; auction design; efficiency; incentive-compatiblity; non-quasi-linear

项目成果

Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for General Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithms

一般偏好的最低价格瓦尔拉斯均衡：串行维克里算法

• 发表时间: 2018
• 作者: FUJINE Masayuki;HASHIMOTO Akane;藤根雅之;Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa;Yu Zhou
• 通讯作者: Yu Zhou

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule

• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019
• 发表时间: 2018-05
• 期刊: Games Econ. Behav.
• 作者: Yu Zhou;Shigehiro Serizawa

Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms

一般偏好的最低价格瓦尔拉斯均衡：串行维克里机制

• 发表时间: 2018
• 作者: OKUBO;Shoki;Yu Zhou
• 通讯作者: Yu Zhou