School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and Experiments

教育资源拥挤的择校：理论与实验

• 批准号: 22K13364
• 负责人: ZHOU YU
• 金额: $ 2.66万
• 依托单位: Kyoto University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2022-04-01 至 2025-03-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-22K13364/
• 关键词: School choice; Crowding effect; Education resource; Financial constraints; Auction algorithm

The first research achievement is that I published one journal paper and one working paper. My paper “Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples” joint with Shigehiro Serizawa is published at Games and Economic Behaviors.I also published a working paper “Crowding in School Choice”, joint with William Phan and Ryan Tierney. This paper is one of the main results of this project. I presented this paper at the 2022 Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. I visited Southeast University, Nanjing, China, Maastricht University, the Netherlands, Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and Paris School of Economics, France, to discuss with researchers there about my latest work.

第一个研究成就是我发表了一份期刊论文和一份工作论文。我的论文“超出准线性的多物体拍卖设计：与Shigehiro Serizawa的关节超出了领先的示例”，与William Phan和Ryan Tierney联合发表了Games and Economic Chandiors。本文是该项目的主要结果之一。我在2022年社会选择与福利协会会议上发表了本文。我访问了东南大学，中国南京，马斯特里赫特大学，荷兰，蒂尔堡大学，荷兰和法国经济学院，与那里的研究人员讨论我的最新工作。

项目成果

School Choice with Crowding

择校拥挤

• 发表时间: 2022
• 作者: Abe Takaaki;Nakada Satoshi;Takaaki Abe;Takaaki Abe;Takaaki Abe;Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa;Yu Zhou
• 通讯作者: Yu Zhou