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School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and Experiments

School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and Experiments
教育资源拥挤的择校:理论与实验
批准号:
22K13364
负责人:
ZHOU YU
金额:
$2.66万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
财政年份:
2022
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:
2022-04-01 至 2025-03-31

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中文摘要
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英文摘要
The first research achievement is that I published one journal paper and one working paper. My paper “Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples” joint with Shigehiro Serizawa is published at Games and Economic Behaviors.I also published a working paper “Crowding in School Choice”, joint with William Phan and Ryan Tierney. This paper is one of the main results of this project. I presented this paper at the 2022 Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. I visited Southeast University, Nanjing, China, Maastricht University, the Netherlands, Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and Paris School of Economics, France, to discuss with researchers there about my latest work.
期刊论文(4)
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科研奖励(0)
会议论文
DOI: --
发表时间: 2022
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Abe Takaaki, Nakada Satoshi, Takaaki Abe, Takaaki Abe, Takaaki Abe, Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa, Yu Zhou]
通讯作者: Yu Zhou
Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples .
超越准线性的多对象拍卖设计:领先示例。
DOI: --
发表时间: 2022
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Yu Zhou]
通讯作者: Yu Zhou
Theory and Experiment of Efficient Multi-item Auctions with Financial Constraints
  • 批准号:
    19K13653
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
  • 资助金额:
    $2.58万
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 负责人:
    ZHOU YU
  • 依托单位:
Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Auction Design Beyond Quasi-Linearity: Theory and Experiment
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