Stoic Logic of Language With Chrysippus and Beyond

克律西波斯及其他语言的斯多葛派逻辑

• 批准号: 450927166
• 负责人: Dr. Karlheinz Hülser
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Fachbereich Philosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2019-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/450927166?language=en
• 关键词: Stoic; Logic; Language; Chrysippus; Beyond

In 1935 Łukasiewicz convinced the scientific community that Stoic logic in comparison with Aristotelian logic would be significantly different. Hence, intensive investigations started, mainly since the nineteen-sixties and after. In view of the fragmentary sources the research work was so effective that remaining questions very often appear to recede into the background. During the last years, however, the studies in Stoic dialectics re-emerged. The project »Stoic Logic of Language With Chrysippus and Beyond« joins in the Stoics' understanding of predicates, studying its development beyond Chrysippus. Thus, it shows how the analytical approach to the question of the constitution of objects changed in Stoicism, until modern logic could pick it up, together with its difficulties.The project relies on two pillars: one, the Stoic definitions, and connected explanations, of the predicate. This material challenges to demonstrate that concerning the understanding of predi-cates there was a development in doctrine within the Stoa. Two, to clarify the developmental scope, unrelated distinctive positions will be discussed; they related to detailed issues, and were developed in the Stoa, partly already before Chrysippus, partly by Chrysippus himself. Just these positions, yet, required further consideration, and post-Chrysippean Stoic logicians presumably tried to surpass those positions. In all cases, however, adequate revisions would require to modify the concept of predicate somehow, in that very direction shown by one of the respective Stoic definitions. In detail the issues or views under discussion will be: the doubts Zeno of Citium developed against the rule that in the lawcourt before forming a judgment both of the parties should be heard; Chrysippus' dissatisfying analysis of deictic demonstrative pronouns and the Stoic division of propositions; Chrysippus' hesitation to use quantifiers, and to interprete by me-ans of his logic also Aristotelian syllogisms; and schemata of arguments.Having elaborated the two ›pillars‹ as indicated, the findings will be brought together. Therewith it will be possible (a) to specify the development concerning predicates, regarding time and content, (b) to explain in greater detail how to conceive the revising processes of the ›pillar-2‹ positions, and (c) to collect some added value, e.g. a closer understanding of the Stoics' view on universals. In addition, (d) it will be possible not only to demonstrate the affinity of the post-chrysippean predicate-concept to Fregee's concept of function, but also to examine Frege's related concept of argument in the light of the Stoic concept of cases. It is here, at the latest, that the question arises what the Stoic and what the modern logic have to say about the constitution of objects.

1935年Łukasiewicz使科学界相信，斯多葛逻辑与亚里士多德逻辑相比会有显著的不同。因此，深入的调查开始了，主要是从20世纪60年代开始的。由于资料来源不完整，研究工作非常有效，以致遗留下来的问题似乎常常退居次要地位。然而，在最近几年，斯多葛辩证法的研究重新出现。“斯多葛学派的语言逻辑与克里西普斯和超越”项目加入了斯多葛学派对谓词的理解，研究其在克里西普斯之后的发展。因此，它显示了斯多葛派对对象构成问题的分析方法是如何改变的，直到现代逻辑能够接受它，连同它的困难。该项目依赖于两个支柱：一是对谓词的斯多葛定义和相关解释。这一材料试图证明，在对谓词的理解方面，美国内部的学说有了发展。二、明确发展范围，将不相关的鲜明立场进行论述；它们与细节问题相关，在《斯托亚书》中发展起来，部分是在克里西普斯之前，部分是克里西普斯本人。然而，正是这些立场需要进一步的考虑，后希腊斯多葛学派的逻辑学家可能试图超越这些立场。然而，在所有情况下，适当的修订都需要以某种方式修改谓词的概念，这正是斯多葛派定义所显示的方向。详细讨论的问题或观点将是：西提姆的芝诺对在法院作出判决之前双方都应听取意见的规则提出的质疑；克里西普斯对指示指示代词的不满意分析与斯多葛派的命题划分克里西普斯不愿使用量词，不愿用我来解释他的逻辑，也不愿用亚里士多德的三段论；以及论点的图式。在详细阐述了所指出的两个“支柱”之后，将把调查结果汇集在一起。因此，它将有可能(a)详细说明关于谓词的发展，关于时间和内容，(b)更详细地解释如何构思“支柱2”位置的修订过程，以及(c)收集一些附加价值，例如更深入地理解斯多葛学派对共相的看法。此外，(d)不仅有可能证明后克里希伯的谓词概念与弗雷格的功能概念的亲缘关系，而且还可以根据斯多葛学派的案例概念来检验弗雷格的相关论证概念。最迟在这里，问题出现了，斯多葛派和现代逻辑对客体的构成有何看法。