Stoic Logic of Language With Chrysippus and Beyond

在1935年，Eschukasiewicz说服科学界，斯多葛逻辑与亚里士多德逻辑相比将是显著不同的。因此，集中调查开始了，主要是从1960年代及以后。由于资料来源不完整，研究工作非常有效，剩下的问题似乎常常退居幕后。然而，在过去的几年里，斯多葛辩证法的研究重新出现。该项目»语言与Chrysippus和超越的斯多葛逻辑«加入了斯多葛学派对谓词的理解，研究其超越Chrysippus的发展。因此，它显示了斯多葛学派对客体构成问题的分析方法是如何改变的，直到现代逻辑能够接受它，以及它的困难。这个项目依赖于两个支柱：一，斯多葛学派对谓词的定义和相关解释。这一材料的挑战，以证明有关predi-cates的理解有一个发展的学说内斯托阿。第二，为了澄清发展的范围，将讨论不相关的独特立场;它们涉及到详细的问题，并在Stoa中发展，部分在Chrysippus之前，部分由Chrysippus自己。然而，正是这些立场需要进一步的考虑，而后克里西普斯·斯多葛学派的逻辑学家大概试图超越这些立场。然而，在所有的情况下，适当的修正都需要以某种方式修改谓词的概念，就像斯多葛学派的定义所显示的那样。具体而言，本文讨论的问题或观点有：齐蒂乌姆的芝诺对法庭在作出判决之前应听取双方当事人意见这一规则的怀疑;克吕西普斯对指示代词和斯多葛学派对命题的划分的不满意的分析;克吕西普斯对使用量词的犹豫，以及对他的逻辑和亚里士多德的三段论的不满意;在阐述了所指出的两大支柱之后，将把研究结果汇总在一起。这样就有可能：（a）具体说明关于谓词、关于时间和内容的发展;（B）更详细地解释如何设想第二支柱立场的修正过程;（c）收集一些附加值，例如更深入地理解斯多葛学派关于共相的观点。此外，（d）不仅可以证明后克里希普斯谓词概念与弗雷格的函数概念的密切关系，而且可以根据斯多葛学派的格概念来考察弗雷格的相关论元概念。最迟也是在这里，问题出现了，斯多葛学派和现代逻辑对客体的构成有什么看法。

In 1935 Łukasiewicz convinced the scientific community that Stoic logic in comparison with Aristotelian logic would be significantly different. Hence, intensive investigations started, mainly since the nineteen-sixties and after. In view of the fragmentary sources the research work was so effective that remaining questions very often appear to recede into the background. During the last years, however, the studies in Stoic dialectics re-emerged. The project »Stoic Logic of Language With Chrysippus and Beyond« joins in the Stoics' understanding of predicates, studying its development beyond Chrysippus. Thus, it shows how the analytical approach to the question of the constitution of objects changed in Stoicism, until modern logic could pick it up, together with its difficulties.The project relies on two pillars: one, the Stoic definitions, and connected explanations, of the predicate. This material challenges to demonstrate that concerning the understanding of predi-cates there was a development in doctrine within the Stoa. Two, to clarify the developmental scope, unrelated distinctive positions will be discussed; they related to detailed issues, and were developed in the Stoa, partly already before Chrysippus, partly by Chrysippus himself. Just these positions, yet, required further consideration, and post-Chrysippean Stoic logicians presumably tried to surpass those positions. In all cases, however, adequate revisions would require to modify the concept of predicate somehow, in that very direction shown by one of the respective Stoic definitions. In detail the issues or views under discussion will be: the doubts Zeno of Citium developed against the rule that in the lawcourt before forming a judgment both of the parties should be heard; Chrysippus' dissatisfying analysis of deictic demonstrative pronouns and the Stoic division of propositions; Chrysippus' hesitation to use quantifiers, and to interprete by me-ans of his logic also Aristotelian syllogisms; and schemata of arguments.Having elaborated the two ›pillars‹ as indicated, the findings will be brought together. Therewith it will be possible (a) to specify the development concerning predicates, regarding time and content, (b) to explain in greater detail how to conceive the revising processes of the ›pillar-2‹ positions, and (c) to collect some added value, e.g. a closer understanding of the Stoics' view on universals. In addition, (d) it will be possible not only to demonstrate the affinity of the post-chrysippean predicate-concept to Fregee's concept of function, but also to examine Frege's related concept of argument in the light of the Stoic concept of cases. It is here, at the latest, that the question arises what the Stoic and what the modern logic have to say about the constitution of objects.